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EXPOSING SEX STEREOTYPES IN RECENT SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE JURISPRUDENCE
DEBORAH A. WIDISS, ELIZABETH L. ROSENBLATT,
DOUGLAS NEJAIME*
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held in Baehr v. Lewin1 that same-
sex couples denied the right to marry could state a claim for sex discrimina-
tion.  With that decision, an argument that had previously been primarily a
matter of academic debate was thrust into the center of one of the defining
cultural wars of our time.  Following Baehr, same-sex couples filed lawsuits
in at least eleven states.  In the past few years, the highest state courts in
Vermont,2 Massachusetts,3 New Jersey,4 New York,5 and Washington,6 as
well as intermediate courts in Arizona7 and Indiana,8 have ruled on the issue;
as of May 2007, appeals are pending in the highest courts in California,9
Connecticut,10 and Maryland.11  Some suits have been won by plaintiffs,
* Deborah A. Widiss, Visiting Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School; Senior
Staff Attorney, Legal Momentum (until July 2007); J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Yale
University.  Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Associate, Irell & Manella LLP; J.D., Harvard Law
School; B.A., Williams College.  Douglas NeJaime, Williams Institute Teaching Fellow,
UCLA School of Law; Associate, Irell & Manella LLP (until April 2007); J.D., Harvard
Law School; B.A., Brown University.  As a staff attorney at Legal Momentum (the new
name of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund) and pro bono counsel for Legal Mo-
mentum, the authors of this Article have submitted several amicus briefs making sex
discrimination arguments in the marriage cases discussed in this Article.  The views ex-
pressed in the Article, however, are our own and do not necessarily reflect the position of
Legal Momentum.  We are grateful to Jennifer Brown, Tim Casey, David Cruz, Jon Da-
vidson, Julie Kay, Linda Kerber, Reva Siegel, and members of the LGBT Civil Rights
Litigators’ Roundtable for their insightful comments and suggestions.  This Article has
also benefited considerably from able research assistance from Jordan Goldberg and
Christine Doktor.  We would also like to thank the students of the Harvard Journal of
Law & Gender for their careful editing.
1 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that state marriage statute em-
ploys sex-based classification subject to strict scrutiny under state equal protection
provision).
2 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
3 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
4 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
5 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
6 Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
7 Standhardt v. Super. Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003), review denied, No. CV-03-0422-PR, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62 (Ariz. May 25, 2004).
8 Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
9 In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review
granted, 149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006).
10 Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
11 Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145 (Md. Jan. 20, 2006),
appeal docketed, 903 A.2d 416 (2006).
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leading either to marriage (Massachusetts) or civil unions providing all of
the benefits of marriage (New Jersey and Vermont).  Others, largely in
closely divided opinions, have been lost by plaintiffs (New York and Wash-
ington).  But while sex discrimination has been argued by the plaintiffs in
each of these cases, no state high court since Baehr has found that denying a
same-sex couple the right to marry successfully states a sex discrimination
claim.  Rather, the subsequent decisions have either ignored or rejected sex
discrimination arguments.  Indeed—and most troubling—several of the
more recent opinions rejecting same-sex couples’ claims to the right to marry
have actually relied in part on sex stereotypes, even as they reject arguments
that such stereotypes are embodied in and perpetuated by exclusionary mar-
riage laws.
This Article considers the sex discrimination arguments in the context
of the flurry of recent decisions issued by state courts and the arguments
presented by parties and amici before those courts.  Now that there is a criti-
cal mass of decisions regarding limiting marriage to different-sex couples,
we can see patterns in how the sex discrimination argument has been used
by litigants and received by courts.  Thus, the primary objective of this Arti-
cle is not to evaluate the academic merits of the sex discrimination argument
(which many commentators, some cited herein, have done before us), but
rather to strengthen that argument by closely reading recent decisions issued
in the marriage cases across the country and placing those decisions in con-
text with selected sex discrimination jurisprudence.
Specifically, this Article attempts to diagnose why recent high court
majorities have not accepted previous iterations of the sex discrimination
argument in favor of marriage rights for same-sex couples, and to provide
support that may have been overlooked in such previous iterations.  It con-
cludes that the sex discrimination argument is based on two interconnected
arguments: first, that restrictive marriage statutes facially discriminate on the
basis of sex, and second, that the rationales offered as justifications for the
sex-based classifications in these statutes rely upon sex stereotypes that may
not be the basis for government action.  This Article argues that the facial
sex discrimination argument draws normative strength from, and vindicates
values associated with, the sex stereotyping argument.  In recent cases, the
facial sex discrimination argument has been presented as distinct from the
more substantive sex stereotyping argument, making it unnecessarily vulner-
able to a claim that the state has not discriminated because the sex-based
restrictions in marriage statutes apply equally to (gay) men and (lesbian)
women.  Showing that justifications for sex classifications in marriage stat-
utes perpetuate sex stereotypes that can subordinate women and can limit the
freedom of both women and men to choose how to structure their lives
strengthens the analogy between the sex discrimination argument in these
cases and the race discrimination argument in the Supreme Court’s ground-
breaking anti-miscegenation case, Loving v. Virginia, in which the Court
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held that the right to marry could not be restricted on the basis of race by a
law whose rationales and classifications perpetuated racial hierarchy.12
In fact, as our review of recent decisions demonstrates, courts regularly
impute to legislatures justifications for limiting marriage to different-sex
couples that rely upon sex-based stereotypes that have been found to be un-
constitutional sex discrimination in other contexts.  Courts, for example,
have upheld different-sex marriage requirements on the grounds that men
and women, simply by virtue of their gender, provide distinct role models
for children; that men and women play “opposite” or “complementary”
roles within marriage; and that marriage is essential to protect vulnerable
women from irresponsible men who, absent the bonds of marriage, would
abandon their children.13  Such unexamined reliance on sex stereotypes
stands in sharp contrast to recent changes in family law and constitutional
law requiring gender neutrality, which has led to the removal of explicit sex-
based classifications and the disavowal of sex-based presumptions in cus-
tody, alimony, and other areas that had previously relied on gender stereo-
types.  Exposing the sex stereotypes at play makes it more likely that the
classifications will be acknowledged as a form of facial sex discrimination
by demonstrating a real “harm” caused by the sex-based classifications and,
more generally, helps discredit the proffered rationalizations as insufficient
to meet even “rational basis” review.
The Article shows that, for many, opposition to marriage for same-sex
couples is part of a socially conservative philosophy that holds that sexual
activity is only appropriate within (heterosexual) marriage and that is articu-
lated in programs as varied as publicly-funded abstinence-only education
and marriage promotion programs as part of welfare reform.  Not all who
oppose marriage for same-sex couples espouse this larger philosophy, but
examining the views of those who do reveals how opposition to marriage for
same-sex couples is often intertwined with efforts to enforce gender-differ-
entiated family roles.  Conservatives who argue against marriage for same-
sex couples explicitly and implicitly invoke sex stereotypes about women’s
and men’s roles.  The connection is not new.  A generation ago, in the 1970s
and 1980s, conservative activists argued against proposed federal and state
equal rights amendments (“ERAs”) on the ground that they would require
recognition of marriage rights for same-sex couples.14  In arguing that the
ERA would invalidate sex-based limitations on who could marry, the
amendment’s opponents consciously used public discomfort with the concept
of marriage by same-sex couples to undermine support for constitutional
guarantees of sex equality.  And today, many organizations leading opposi-
tion to expansion of marriage rights for same-sex couples characterize their
efforts as part of a larger agenda to roll back sex discrimination law to per-
12 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1967).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 122–135, 138–147, 158–163. R
14 See infra text accompanying notes 23–27. R
\\server05\productn\h\hlg\30-2\hlg407.txt unknown Seq: 4 26-JUL-07 12:01
464 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 30
mit the government once again to promote sex-stereotyped gender roles.15
Of course, individuals and individual families today, as in the past, may
choose to structure their relationships in accordance with traditional gender
roles.  But, this Article argues, under modern sex discrimination jurispru-
dence, the government cannot justify the use of sex-based classifications—
in marriage laws or in other contexts—by assumptions that individuals will,
or should, conform to traditional gender roles.
Part I of this Article explains the sex discrimination arguments in favor
of marriage for lesbians and gay men and puts such arguments in the context
of briefs actually filed by plaintiffs’ counsel and amici curiae in marriage
cases.  Part II charts the courts’ receptivity, or lack thereof, to such argu-
ments, from the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin to re-
cent decisions by courts in a number of states.  Part III demonstrates that the
sex discrimination argument may be strengthened by grounding the facial
sex discrimination argument in a discussion of sex stereotyping to show how
the sex-based classifications limit individual freedom and tend to maintain
gender hierarchies.  Finally, Part IV exposes the way in which harmful sex
stereotypes do, in fact, underlie restrictive marriage statutes and assumptions
regarding those statutes, even to this day.  Indeed, Part IV reveals how many
courts and judges have relied on harmful sex stereotypes to justify marriage
restrictions.  By highlighting the extent to which the statutory objectives
identified as underlying different-sex marriage restrictions actually depend
on sex-based stereotypes regarding gender roles, this Article strengthens the
case for striking down such restrictions as unlawful sex discrimination.
I. ARTICULATING THE SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Of the numerous grounds on which state and federal laws restricting
marriage to different-sex couples may be challenged as unconstitutional, sex
discrimination has the potential to be a particularly powerful tool.  It has a
logical strength that is easy to grasp: the laws at issue clearly use sex-based
classifications in prescribing that a man may only marry a woman and that a
woman may only marry a man.  As a practical matter, it elevates the level of
scrutiny applied to discriminatory marriage laws from the rational basis re-
view commonly afforded classifications based on sexual orientation to the
heightened intermediate or, in some states, strict scrutiny afforded classifica-
tions based on gender.  And it may reach members of the public (and mem-
bers of courts) who are not particularly concerned about discrimination
against lesbians and gay men but care passionately about discrimination
against women.16
15 See infra Part IV.D.
16 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Same-Sex Couples: Defining Marriage in the
Twenty-First Century: Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 124–26 (2005) (suggesting gender talk
\\server05\productn\h\hlg\30-2\hlg407.txt unknown Seq: 5 26-JUL-07 12:01
2007] Sex Stereotypes in Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence 465
Significantly, the sex discrimination argument is not new to the debate
over marriage rights for same-sex couples.  Plaintiffs advanced sex discrimi-
nation arguments during the first wave of court cases by same-sex couples
seeking the right to marry in the 1970s.  That era’s increased success with
sex equality legislation and jurisprudence, however, did not translate into the
right to marry for same-sex couples.  For example, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in Baker v. Nelson17 denied a sex discrimination claim in holding
Minnesota’s restriction of marriage to different-sex couples constitutional.
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ analogy to Loving v. Virginia,18 concluding,
without explanation, that “there is a clear distinction between a marital re-
striction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental differ-
ence in sex.”19  A few years later, in Singer v. Hara, the Washington State
Court of Appeal rejected a same-sex couple’s claim that restricting marriage
to different-sex couples violated the state’s recently-passed Equal Rights
Amendment (“ERA”).20  Relying on tautological reasoning, the court held
that the plaintiffs “are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship
because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry into the marriage
relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one
which may be entered into only by two persons who are members of the
opposite sex.”21  The court rejected the analogy to Loving and held that the
ERA was inapposite, citing commentary from proponents of the state ERA
who had specifically rejected the contention that the amendment would re-
quire permitting same-sex couples to marry.22
could be an effective strategy for broadening support for marriage for same-sex couples);
Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). Even critics of the
approach recognize these benefits, while noting that they may also be perceived as weak-
nesses in that they privilege a harm that is not the primary motivation or injury of the
laws. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian
and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001) (acknowledging certain strategic advan-
tages of the sex discrimination approach, but arguing that laws limiting gay and lesbian
rights are primarily motivated by homophobia and primarily harm gay men and lesbian
women and that focusing on sexism and harm to women misstates the primary harm).
17 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d. 185 (Minn. 1971).  The couple appealed the case to
the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal “for want of a substantial
federal question.”  Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).  At least one court consid-
ering a recent case brought by a same-sex couple seeking to marry held that Baker consti-
tutes a definitive determination by the Supreme Court that different-sex marriage
requirements do not violate the federal Equal Protection Clause. See Morrison v. Sadler,
821 N.E.2d 15, 19–20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).  However, the Supreme Court’s dismissal in
Baker was issued several years before Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), estab-
lished that sex-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny.  Thus, it is inap-
propriate to deem Baker as binding precedent under modern sex discrimination standards.
18 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
19 Baker, 191 N.W.2d. at 187.
20 Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
21 Id. at 1192.
22 Id. at 1191 n.5 (quoting an election preview supplement published in the Seattle
newspaper that explained, “Opponents argue that passage [of the state ERA] would le-
galize homosexual marriage, deny preferential treatment to women in divorce settle-
ments, make women eligible for Army combat duty, allow coed sports wrestling in
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In fact, the specter of marriage by same-sex couples played a central
role in debates during the 1970s over the federal Equal Rights Amendment.23
The federal ERA was approved in Congress by large margins in 1972 and
ratified by thirty of the thirty-eight states required within two years; ratifica-
tion then slowed radically and finally stopped completely.  As Reva Siegel
details, the opposition movement, led by Phyllis Schlafly’s remarkably effec-
tive STOP ERA organization, “linked together the ERA, abortion, and ho-
mosexuality in ways that changed the meaning of each, and mobilized a
grassroots, ‘profamily constituency’ to oppose this unholy trinity.”24  Recog-
nizing that marriage rights for same-sex couples (as well as abortion rights)
discomforted much of the public who were otherwise supportive of guaran-
teeing sex equality, ERA opponents used these hot-button issues to derail
passage of the ERA, which had seemed almost assured.
Schlafly, presaging sex discrimination arguments made in contempo-
rary cases (though obviously with a very different intent), argued against the
ERA on the grounds that it would require granting same-sex couples the
right to marry because “[i]t is precisely ‘on account of sex’ that a state now
denies a marriage license to a man and a man, or to a woman and a wo-
man.”25  Schlafly also explicitly tied the possibility of marriage for same-sex
couples to “degradat[ion]” of women’s homemaker role and traditional gen-
der roles within families.26  Other anti-ERA advocates made similar argu-
ments.27  As in Washington state, many proponents of the federal ERA, well
aware of the volatility of the issue, went to lengths to disclaim the possibility
that ratification of the ERA would require permitting same-sex couples to
marry.  For example, at a 1977 conference, ERA advocates adopted a plat-
schools, and eliminate preferential auto, health and life insurance rates for women.  Pro-
ponents describe the foes’ contentions as emotional, irresponsible fantasies, misleading,
deceptive, and incorrect.” Election Preview Supplement, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Nov. 5, 1972).  The decision in 1972 by proponents of the state ERA to disclaim any
effect on different-sex marriage requirements had far-reaching effects.  In 2006, in hold-
ing that Washington’s prohibition on marriage by same-sex couples did not implicate the
state’s ERA, the state Supreme Court relied in part on legislative history from the time of
the ERA’s passage suggesting that it was not intended to require granting same-sex
couples. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 988 (Wash. 2006).  Note, how-
ever, that although the question of whether limiting marriage to heterosexual couples
violates modern sex discrimination law remains undecided, other “irresponsible fanta-
sies,” such as denying sex-based presumptions in divorce settlements or making women
eligible for combat duty, imagined by opponents of the state’s ERA—and disclaimed at
that point by proponents—have come to pass, often as specifically required under mod-
ern sex discrimination law.
23 Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitu-
tional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1389–1403 (2006).
Our thanks to Reva Siegel for bringing this history to our attention.
24 Id. at 1390.
25 PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 90 (1977).
26 Id. at 85–90 (grouping together tax and childcare polices that Schlafly asserted
were likely to “drive wives and mothers out of the home”; removal of restrictions on
abortion; and rights for gay men and lesbians to marry, teach in schools, and adopt chil-
dren as likely “effects on the family” of an ERA).
27 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 23, at 1393 n.208, 1394 n.209. R
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form proclaiming “ERA will NOT change or weaken family structure
. . . ERA will NOT require States to permit homosexual marriage.”28  Some
ERA supporters, on the other hand, explicitly argued, or at least “acknowl-
edged,” that one of the benefits of the ERA was that it would require elimi-
nation of different-sex requirements for civil marriages.29
Thus, it is not only contemporary advocates for expansion of marriage
rights that understand that the government’s refusal to permit same-sex
couples to marry implicates sex discrimination concerns and that much resis-
tance to marriage for same-sex couples is intimately related to the perpetua-
tion of gender-differentiated family roles; conservative advocates have been
making similar arguments (though with the opposite intended effect) for sev-
eral decades.  And, as discussed in Part IV, conservative groups today con-
tinue to oppose marriage for same-sex couples as part of a larger effort to
promote a return to sex-stereotyped gender roles within marriage.30  Signifi-
cantly, advocates on both sides of the ERA issue—that is, both those who
“acknowledged” and those who “warned”—were correct in noting that ro-
bust protection against sex discrimination by the government would require
28 Id. at 1401 (quoting NAT’L COMM’N ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INT’L WOMEN’S YEAR,
THE SPIRIT OF HOUSTON: THE FIRST NATIONAL WOMEN’S CONFERENCE, AN OFFICIAL RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 51
(1978)).  Of course, statements from thirty years ago regarding a constitutional amend-
ment that was never enacted have no weight in determining whether different-sex mar-
riage requirements violate modern sex discrimination standards. Cf. Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (observing, in holding that
male-on-male sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, that it “assuredly [was]
not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII . . . . [b]ut
statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed”).
29 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 23, at 1400 (citing S.T. Perkins & A.J. R
Silverstein, Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 583–88
(1972–1973) (arguing that proposed ERA would require granting marriage licenses to
same-sex couples)).  Siegel notes that Schlafly “immediately republished the relevant
pages of the article in full.” Id.; see also SCHLAFLY, supra note 25, at 91 (quoting testi- R
mony before Senate Judiciary Committee by Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund as stat-
ing, “Indeed, if the law must be as undiscriminating concerning sex as it is toward race, it
would follow that laws outlawing wedlock between members of the same sex would be
as invalid as laws forbidding miscegenation.  Whether the proponents of the Amendment
shrink from these implications is not clear.”).
30 Conservative activists continue to oppose the ERA by arguing it would lead to
recognition of marriage rights for same-sex couples.  In 2007, the federal ERA was re-
introduced in Congress as the Women’s Equality Amendment.  The conservative organi-
zation Concerned Women for America immediately put out a press release opposing the
ERA and noting specifically that “State-passed ERAs were used by courts to declare
same-sex marriage in Hawaii” as well as to require state funding for abortions in New
Mexico.  Concerned Women for America, ERA: An Outdated Icon of Radical Feminism,
Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=12675&department=MEDIA
&categoryid=family; see also, e.g., Kathryn Jean Lopez, ERA: Equality for Whom?, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, Feb. 3, 2006, http://dwb.sacbee.com/content/opinion/story/14143574p-149
71931c.html (2006 opinion column discussing Schlafly’s opposition to the “nonsensical”
ERA as “prescient” and decrying Maryland trial court decision that had just found denial
of marriage rights to same-sex couples violated state ERA).
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permitting same-sex couples to marry.  As set forth in Part III, although the
federal ERA was never ratified, the protection against sex discrimination
that we now recognize as guaranteed by the federal Equal Protection Clause
and state analogs (as well as state ERAs that were enacted) should be under-
stood as requiring elimination of different-sex requirements in statutes gov-
erning civil marriage.
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick31
seemed to foreclose privacy-based challenges to the denial of lesbian and
gay rights.  Led by the work of Andrew Koppelman and Sylvia Law, schol-
ars took this opportunity to resurrect a sex discrimination focus within gay
rights commentary.32  These legal experts made explicit the way in which
norms for both gender and sexuality act to police the same conduct and
punish the same violations.  In particular, these scholars showed that the
stigmatization of lesbians and gay men is linked to the subordination of wo-
men.  As Koppelman later explained:
The two stigmas—sex-inappropriateness and homosexuality—are
virtually interchangeable, and each is readily used as a metaphor
for the other.  Moreover, both stigmas have gender-specific forms
that imply that men ought to have power over women.  Gay men
are stigmatized as effeminate, which means insufficiently aggres-
sive and dominant.  Lesbians are stigmatized as too aggressive and
dominant; . . . they appear to be guilty of some kind of
insubordination.33
Through this lens, it becomes clear that the same sex stereotypes that act to
devalue women also work to demonize lesbians and gay men.  Thus, the
scholars argued, just as the U.S. Supreme Court found in Loving that an anti-
miscegenation law unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race, so
should courts recognize that limiting marriage to different-sex couples (or
other forms of discrimination against lesbians and gay men) unconstitution-
ally discriminates on the basis of sex.
Thus conceived, the sex discrimination argument has been presented as
having two distinct parts.  First, a restrictive marriage statute, which only
31 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32 Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimina-
tion, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988); Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of
Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187 (1988).  The theories initially presented by Koppelman
and Law have remained the subject of much scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Appleton,
supra note 16; Stephen Clark, Same-Sex But Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation R
Analogy, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 107 (2002); Sandi Farell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality
Perspective for Understanding LGBT Rights, 13 L. & SEXUALITY 605 (2004); Stein,
supra note 16; Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 R
(1994).  Koppelman has also returned to and refined his ideas in several subsequent arti-
cles. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 129 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
33 Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, supra note 32, at 129. R
\\server05\productn\h\hlg\30-2\hlg407.txt unknown Seq: 9 26-JUL-07 12:01
2007] Sex Stereotypes in Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence 469
allows marriage between a man and a woman, discriminates on its face by
restricting an individual’s right to marry his or her chosen spouse purely on
the basis of gender.  That is, a man is not permitted to marry a man, but
would be permitted to marry that same person if he were a woman.  This is
what we will term the “facial sex discrimination” argument.
The second form of the sex discrimination argument posits that the de-
nial of the right to marry to same-sex couples relies on and enforces imper-
missible sex stereotypes.  This is what we will term the “sex stereotype
discrimination,” or “sex stereotyping” argument.  Broadly, this argument is
that a restrictive marriage statute discriminates because it relies upon and
perpetuates a system under which men and women occupy different mar-
riage and family roles: men must “act like husbands” and women must “act
like wives.”34  The sex stereotyping argument may be understood as vindi-
cating anti-subordination values, on the view that sex stereotypes implicated
by the marriage statute are harmful because they perpetuate a patriarchal
view of marriage and family that presumes a breadwinner, head-of-house-
hold husband/father and a caretaker, subordinate wife/mother.  The argu-
ment also advances liberty interests, prohibiting government enforcement of
sex roles that limit the freedom of individual women and men to depart from
traditional gender roles in choosing their own life paths.  A slightly different
formulation of the argument takes a more libertarian form, positing that the
State should be agnostic as to gender roles, allowing women and men to
choose their roles in marriage and family without government preferences.
That is, regardless of whether it is “good” or “bad” to adhere to traditional
gender roles, the State should express no preference and should allow indi-
vidual women and men to choose for themselves.35
While theorists usually emphasize the extent to which the sex discrimi-
nation argument involves sex stereotypes that enforce gender hierarchies,
litigants have generally separated the facial sex discrimination argument
from the sex stereotype discrimination argument.  Many litigants have cho-
sen to emphasize the facial sex discrimination argument, shying away from
more controversial subordination themes.  For instance, in the pending Cali-
fornia marriage litigation, the brief submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel in the
Court of Appeal first emphasized the facial nature of the classification: “To
conclude that California’s marriage statutes unconstitutionally discriminate
on the basis of sex, this Court need look no further than the existence of a
34 See infra text accompanying notes 102–112; see also, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The R
New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restric-
tions, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 991, 994–97 (2007).
35 Janet Halley provides a useful explanation of how a feminist perspective operates
in its more libertarian form. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO
TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 79 (2006) (explaining how “[t]he more closely [liberal
feminism] hews to the classic liberal view that the state has no business forming strong
views of the good life and good ways of being human, the less it has to say about gender,
the more likely it is to take libertarian forms, and the more likely it is to want to stop at
formal equality”).
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facial classification based on sex and the absence of any current justification
for that restriction.”36  The brief then relied on Loving and California’s state
analog, Perez v. Sharp,37 to argue that the purported “equal application” of
the statutes to women and men does not save it from constitutional scrutiny:
“Although the statute ‘equally’ prohibits men and women from marrying a
person of the same sex, mere equal application to different groups does not
negate the injury to individuals nor immunize a discriminatory statute from
heightened scrutiny.”38
Then, in a separate section of their brief, plaintiffs’ counsel contended
that the restriction on marriage is “a vestige of an era in which the rights and
duties of spouses were defined by gender.”39  Addressing the historical roots
of marriage that subordinated women to men, plaintiffs’ counsel explained
how courts and legislatures have rejected such subordination as “natural”
and have instead taken “steps to eliminate gender as a relevant legal factor
within the marital relationship.”40  In not tying the sex stereotypes at work in
the restriction of marriage to different-sex couples to the facial sex classifi-
cation seen in the marriage statutes, the plaintiffs’ brief presented two seem-
ingly separate justifications for a finding of impermissible sex
discrimination.
Other briefs submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel in marriage cases around
the country have adhered to the same strategy, either laying out the two sex
discrimination arguments as separate concepts or advancing only the facial
sex discrimination argument as the basis of the claim for relief.41  For in-
36 Respondents’ Corrected Answering Brief at 28–29, In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No. A110451) [hereinafter In re Marriage Cases
Respondents’ Brief].
37 Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
38 In re Marriage Cases Respondents’ Brief, supra note 36, at 33–34. R
39 Id. at 37.
40 Id. at 38.
41 An exception to this trend is observed in the plaintiffs’ briefing in Hernandez v.
Robles, in which plaintiffs’ counsel advanced an argument that, to a certain extent, inter-
twined the facial and sex stereotype discrimination arguments.  After explaining that “the
State’s marriage laws . . . explicitly classify—and discriminate—on the basis of sex,”
plaintiffs’ counsel also tied sex stereotype discrimination to a rejection of the “equal
application” theory in arguing that “impermissible [sex] stereotypes are at play when the
State insists that a man’s rightful role is to ‘take’ only a woman in marriage, and a wo-
man’s only a man, so that each will follow their prescribed gender roles.”  Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 71–74, Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No.
103434-04).  Similarly, one set of plaintiffs’ counsel in Washington also connected the
facial and sex stereotype discrimination arguments in the context of Loving. See Brief of
Respondents at 41, Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2004) (No. 75934-1)
(“But the Loving analogy goes deeper.  Behind the logic, here, as in Loving, lies a history
of group-based discrimination.  DOMA is embedded in sexism every bit as much as
miscegenation laws were embedded in racism.”).  Interestingly, the other set of plaintiffs’
counsel in Washington used the language of sex stereotypes to debunk an argument by
the state of a legitimate governmental interest but did not independently advance sex
discrimination as an equality claim. See Brief of Respondents Castle et al. at 45, Ander-
sen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2004) (No. 75934-1) (In arguing that the state’s
definition of marriage is not accommodated by current understandings, plaintiffs’ counsel
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stance, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts
case, plaintiffs’ counsel contended that the state applied the marriage statute
in a way that discriminated based on sex: “Heidi Norton was denied a li-
cense to marry Gina Smith because she is a woman.  But a man can marry
Gina, and if Heidi were a man, she could marry Gina.”42  Plaintiffs’ counsel
also countered the state’s appeal to the “equal application” theory in the
context of Loving and Perez.  However, rather than point to the invidious
nature of the sex discrimination at issue, to analogize to the invidious race
discrimination embodied in the anti-miscegenation statutes, plaintiffs’ coun-
sel used Loving and Perez to demonstrate that the right to marry is an indi-
vidual right that cannot be restricted merely because two groups are treated
the same.  As plaintiffs’ counsel concluded, “[f]rom the perspective of each
individual plaintiff, the defendants set up a sex-based classification by re-
jecting their choice of partner based on their own sex.”43
Plaintiffs’ counsel in Goodridge did not affirmatively argue sex dis-
crimination based on sex stereotypes.  Rather, they employed the concept of
sex stereotypes to counter the defendants’ purported justification for the sex-
based classification.  Rejecting the state’s justification based on procreation,
plaintiffs’ counsel explained that “[t]o rely on generalizations about procre-
ative capacity as the basis for determining who shall participate in legal
rights, as defendants do here, harkens back to an era in which women were
defined by their procreative abilities.”44  Analogous divisions were made by
plaintiffs’ counsel in New Jersey45 and Maryland.46
Following the lead of plaintiffs’ counsel, amici curiae writing briefs fo-
cused on sex discrimination arguments have also, to a large extent, separated
the facial and sex stereotype discrimination arguments.47  For example, in the
stated that “over the years the Legislature and the courts have replaced sexist stereotypes
in marriage with concepts of equality.”).
42 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 56, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860).
43 Id. at 59–60.
44 Id. at 68–69.
45 Compare Brief of Appellants at 30–31, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)
(No. 58, 398) (“[P]ermitting same-sex couples to marry requires nothing more than con-
struing the marriage eligibility requirements to be gender neutral, akin to what was or-
dered in other cases eliminating discriminatory treatment on the basis of the sex of
marital partners.”), with id. at 51 (“By claiming that sex roles must . . . be reified in
marriage, the State urges the Court to take a giant step backwards.”).
46 Compare Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellee at 20–21, Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-
005390, 2006 WL 148145 (Md. Jan. 20, 2006), appeal docketed, 903 A.2d 416 (2006)
(No. 44)  (arguing that “permitting opposite-sex couples but not same-sex couples to
marry constitutes a sex-based classification” and distinguishing the “equal application”
argument based on the principle that “constitutional rights are individual rights, not class
rights”), with id. at 76 (Countering the State’s purported interest in “tradition,” plaintiffs’
counsel explained that the “State has abandoned many aspects of the historical definition
of marriage, which included . . . inequalities based on . . . sex.”).
47 To some extent, this has been to avoid duplication of the arguments made by plain-
tiffs’ counsel.  For example, in the Washington state litigation, plaintiffs’ counsel had
made a facial sex discrimination argument but not a sex stereotyping argument. The
amici curiae brief submitted by various women’s organizations explicitly adopted the
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California litigation, the brief of amici curiae concerned with women’s rights
first explained how the California marriage statute classifies on the basis of
sex and is therefore invalid, despite its purported “equal application” to wo-
men and men.48  Then, separate from the preceding argument, the brief
delved into sex stereotype discrimination.49
Given the initial success of Baehr on facial sex discrimination grounds,
the sharp division between the facial sex discrimination argument and the
sex stereotype arguments is not surprising.  Practitioners, quite reasonably,
positioned the arguments separately for clarity and simplicity.  This ap-
peared to have the obvious benefit of leaving the seductive and relatively
moderate facial sex discrimination argument as an independent ground upon
which a ruling in plaintiffs’ favor could be based.50  However, as demon-
strated below, this strategy has not worked.  State court majorities have gen-
erally relied on an “equal application” theory to reject the facial sex
discrimination argument and then gone on to dismiss the sex stereotype ar-
gument separately, if they have addressed it at all.  Dissenters who have
relied upon the facial sex discrimination argument have generally relied
upon the sex stereotype argument as well.  This should not be surprising: in
many crucial ways, the facial sex discrimination argument is animated by,
and finds normative strength from, the sex stereotyping argument.  This is
demonstrated in greater detail in Parts II, III, and IV of this Article.
II. COURTS’ TREATMENT OF SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENTS
Only recently have enough courts issued marriage decisions to permit a
true test of the viability of sex discrimination arguments as currently articu-
lated by plaintiffs’ counsel and amici curiae.  Therefore, the time is ripe to
assess the courts’ receptivity to a sex discrimination claim and to explore
recent decisions in a way that sheds light on how and why many courts are
rejecting sex discrimination claims in the marriage cases.  Review of the
decisions shows that courts have rejected the facial sex discrimination argu-
ment on the ground that it applies equally to men and women, and have
rejected analogies to Loving, facilitated in part by the decoupling of the fa-
facial sex discrimination argument made by the plaintiffs but focused their brief on the
sex stereotyping argument exclusively. See Brief of Amici Curiae Women’s Organiza-
tions in Support of Respondents at 2, Andersen v. Kings County, 138 P.3d 963, 983
(Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1) [hereinafter Andersen Brief of Amici Curiae].  The Ander-
sen Brief of Amici Curiae was submitted by the authors of this Article.
48 Brief of Amici Curiae Concerned with Women’s Rights at 9–13, In re Marriage
Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No. A110451) [hereinafter In re Mar-
riage Cases Brief of Amici Curiae].  The In re Marriage Cases Brief of Amici Curiae was
submitted by the authors of this Article.
49 Id. at 13–30.
50 See Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Dis-
crimination, supra note 32, at 220 (discussing how a “firewall” exists between the facial R
sex discrimination argument and “more controversial sociological and psychological
claims” relating to gender subordination).
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cial sex discrimination argument and the sex stereotype argument.  To the
extent that state court majorities have reached the sex stereotyping discrimi-
nation theory, they have addressed it separately from the facial sex discrimi-
nation argument, and have generally dismissed it based on a perceived
shortage of proof of discriminatory purpose or intent underlying the mar-
riage laws.
As noted above, the earliest decision in the recent wave of marriage
cases relied on the sex discrimination argument to seriously question the
propriety of a discriminatory marriage law.  In Baehr v. Lewin,51 the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii held that the state’s marriage statutes used sex-based
classifications, that they were therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the
state’s Equal Rights Amendment, and that they could thus only be justified
by a compelling state interest.52  The court remanded so that the trial court
could consider whether the state could present any such compelling interest.
Hawaii subsequently adopted a constitutional amendment permitting the leg-
islature to limit marriage to different-sex couples, mooting the then still-
ongoing appeal.53 Baehr was decided on facial sex discrimination grounds;
it did not address more substantive sex stereotyping arguments.  But despite
this early promise, the facial sex discrimination approach has proven largely
ineffective.54
51 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
52 Id. at 64–67.
53 See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (granting the legislature the power to reserve marriage
to different-sex couples); Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *8 (Haw.
Dec. 9, 1999) (holding that constitutional amendment rendered equal protection challenge
to marriage laws moot).
54 As noted, plaintiffs have included sex discrimination claims in most, if not all, of
the state court cases that have been brought since Baehr.  However, no other state su-
preme court has relied on sex discrimination arguments in holding that statutes limiting
marriage to different-sex couples are unconstitutional.  The trial court in Maryland, an-
other state with an Equal Rights Amendment, did hold that that state’s marriage statute
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of sex.  Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-
005390, 2006 WL 148145 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006), appeal docketed, 903 A.2d 416
(2006).  That decision relied solely on facial sex discrimination reasoning, finding that
the statute employed sexual classifications and therefore under Maryland’s Equal Rights
Amendment was unconstitutional unless the state could show that it was narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling government interest.  The court specifically rejected the
“equal application” theory, relying on cases under Maryland law and finding the analogy
to Loving persuasive, id. at *3–6, and then held that the state had failed to provide suffi-
ciently compelling justifications for the sex based classifications. Id. at *7–9.  The Mary-
land decision is currently being appealed. Significantly, as discussed below, even in other
states that have equal rights amendments, such as Washington, or that use “strict scru-
tiny” to evaluate laws that discriminate on the basis of sex, such as California, facial sex
discrimination arguments have been rejected on equal application grounds. See infra text
accompanying notes 44–47.  The sex discrimination claim may not have been made ex-
plicitly in Standhardt v. Super. Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003), review denied, No. CV-03-0422-PR, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62 (Ariz. May 25,
2004) (denying plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims without specifically
discussing a sex discrimination theory), or in Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (denying plaintiffs’ various claims under the Indiana Constitution without
specifically discussing a sex discrimination theory).  Some Justices, though not writing
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Rather, review of the several decisions issued by state courts in recent
years demonstrates that the facial sex discrimination argument generally
fails, even when plaintiffs succeed on other grounds.  For example, in one of
the earliest marriage decisions from the recent wave of litigation, Baker v.
State,55 the majority of the Vermont Supreme Court found that even though
the state’s denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples was unconstitu-
tional, sex discrimination did not provide “a useful analytic framework for
determining plaintiffs’ rights.”56  First, the court rejected the facial sex dis-
crimination argument based on the “equal application” theory, noting that
the marriage statute was facially neutral because “each sex is equally pro-
hibited from precisely the same conduct.”57  Next, the court rejected the sex
stereotype discrimination argument:
Our colleague argues . . . that the effect, if not the purpose, of the
exclusion of same-sex partners from the marriage laws is to main-
tain certain male and female stereotypes to the detriment of both.
To support the claim, she cites a number of antiquated statutes that
denied married women a variety of freedoms, including the right
to enter into contracts and hold property.  The test to evaluate
whether a facially gender-neutral statute discriminates on the basis
of sex is whether the law ‘can be traced to a discriminatory pur-
pose.’  The evidence does not demonstrate such a purpose.  It is
one thing to show that long-repealed marriage statutes subordi-
nated women to men within the marital relation.  It is quite another
to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage laws excluded
same-sex couples because of incorrect and discriminatory assump-
tions about gender roles or anxiety about gender-role confusion.58
Recent wins for plaintiffs in Massachusetts and New Jersey have similarly
been on grounds other than sex discrimination.  The New Jersey court did
not provide any ruling on the sex discrimination argument in holding that
denying committed same-sex couples the rights and benefits of marriage vi-
olated their rights under the state’s equal protection guarantees.59  Similarly,
the Massachusetts court found that the state’s different-sex requirement
failed to satisfy even rational basis review and did not specifically address
whether it was properly understood as a form of sex discrimination.60
for court majorities, have accepted the sex discrimination claims of same-sex couples.
See infra text accompanying notes 76–82. R
55 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
56 Id. at 880 n.13.
57 Id.
58 Id. (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
59 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
60 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).  The court
noted that Article 1 of the Massachusetts Constitution specifically prohibits sex-based
discrimination and states that since it resolves the case using rational basis review, it need
not decide whether “sexual orientation” is a suspect classification. Id. at 961 n.21.  The
fact that the footnote refers specifically to “sexual orientation” discrimination and not to
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The facial sex discrimination argument has also failed in recent deci-
sions denying plaintiffs’ claims.  These decisions have generally used the
“equal application” theory to reject the claim.  In Hernandez v. Robles,61 the
New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, held that the state’s
denial of marriage to individuals who wish to marry other individuals of the
same sex “does not put men and women in different classes, and give one
class a benefit not given to the other.”62  In Andersen v. King County,63 the
Washington Supreme Court similarly found that “[m]en and women are
treated identically under DOMA [the state Defense of Marriage Act];
neither may marry a person of the same sex.”64  Therefore, the court con-
cluded that Washington’s DOMA “does not discriminate on account of
sex.”65  Although it has not yet reached the California Supreme Court, the
majority of California’s Court of Appeal has ruled similarly to the high
courts of New York and Washington.  The court held that California’s mar-
riage law does not discriminate based on sex because it “treat[s] men and
women exactly the same, in that neither group is permitted to marry a person
of the same gender.”66
In finding that the statutes at issue apply equally to both women and
men and therefore do not discriminate based on sex, these courts adopted the
very “equal application” theory expressly rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Loving.  Generally, courts have justified their holdings by reasoning
that the anti-miscegenation statute at issue in Loving was intended to perpet-
uate white supremacy67 and contending that no similarly sexist purpose un-
sex discrimination suggests that it may not have been considering the case as potentially
raising sex discrimination issues. Goodridge is, however, the only recent majority opin-
ion other than Hawaii’s Baehr opinion to refer favorably to sex discrimination arguments.
Although the court did not adopt a sex discrimination argument in favor of the plaintiffs,
the court highlighted the sex stereotypes apparent in Justice Cordy’s dissenting opinion.
Rejecting Justice Cordy’s assertion that marriage is tied to the “‘optimal’ mother and
father setting for child rearing,” id. at 965 n.28 (quoting id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissent-
ing)), the court explained that such an idea “hews perilously close to the argument, long
repudiated by the Legislature and the courts, that men and women are so innately and
fundamentally different that their respective ‘proper spheres’ can be rigidly and univer-
sally delineated.” Id. at 965 n.28.  In fact, the court noted that “legislative enactments
and decisions of this court negate any such stereotypical premises.” Id.  The court did
not address the “equal application” theory.  Justice Cordy, however, relied in his dissent
on an “equal application” theory in rejecting a facial sex discrimination argument. See
id. at 991–92 (Cordy, J., dissenting).  Justice Greaney, concurring, relied explicitly on
both facial and sex stereotype discrimination grounds. See infra text accompanying notes
80–81. R
61 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
62 Id. at 10.
63 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
64 Id. at 988.
65 Id.
66 In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev’g 149
P.3d 737 (2006).
67 As discussed below, Loving does have language that suggests that white suprema-
cist objectives of the anti-miscegenation statute were part of the basis for the Court’s
holding that it was unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 88–89.  Earlier R
Supreme Court decisions, however, had rejected the “equal application” argument with-
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derlies the different-sex requirements in marriage laws.  For instance, in
Hernandez, the court rejected the analogy to anti-miscegenation laws, find-
ing that
the historical background of Loving is different from the history
underlying this case.  Racism has been recognized for centuries—
at first by a few people, and later by many more—as a revolting
moral evil . . . . [T]he traditional definition of marriage is not
merely a by-product of historical injustice.  Its history is of a dif-
ferent kind.68
Distinguishing Loving, the court reasoned that “[t]his is not the kind of
sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving; the statute there
. . . was in substance anti-black legislation.  Plaintiffs do not argue here that
the legislation they challenge is designed to subordinate either men to wo-
men or women to men as a class.”69  Likewise, the California intermediate
court held that “[t]he analogy to statutes prohibiting interracial marriage is
not entirely apt,”70 because, although Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law was
“a vehicle to perpetuate invidious racial discrimination. . . [,] [n]o evidence
indicates California’s opposite-sex definition of marriage was intended to
discriminate against males or females.”71
After rejecting the facial sex discrimination based on a perceived dis-
tinction between the invidious race discrimination in Loving and the lack
(they contend) of invidious sex discrimination underlying the marriage stat-
utes, the courts have either rejected or completely ignored the separate sex
stereotyping discrimination argument.  For instance, the Andersen court
found “unpersuasive” the argument that “keeping marriage as an exclu-
sively heterosexual institution is based on gender-role stereotypes and exclu-
sion of those who do not conform to them.”72  The court, explaining that
“nothing in DOMA . . . speaks to gender stereotyping within marriage,”
pointed to plaintiffs’ failure “to show that gay and lesbian persons are ex-
out requiring a showing that the statutes at issue perpetuated racial hierarchies, see infra
note 86, and Loving is clear that notwithstanding the “equal application” of the anti- R
miscegenation statute, the mere use of racial classifications was sufficient to trigger
heightened scrutiny. See infra text accompanying note 87.  Thus, as described more fully R
below, reliance by some courts on Loving’s white supremacy language to distinguish
Loving and thus to conclude that the sex-based classifications at issue in state marriage
statutes do not require heightened scrutiny is inappropriate.
68 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006).
69 Id. at 11.
70 In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 708.
71 Id.; see also Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006) (Finding
Loving to be “not analogous,” the court noted that “[m]en and women are treated identi-
cally under DOMA” and such equal application is not undermined by any invidious sex
discrimination.); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (holding that
“[a]lthough the concurring and dissenting opinion invokes . . . Loving, the reliance is
misplaced” because the court found no invidious sex discrimination at issue to compare
with the invidious race discrimination at issue in Loving (citation omitted)).
72 Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989.
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cluded from marriage on account of or in order to perpetuate gender stere-
otyping.”73  Similarly, the California Court of Appeal also rejected the sex
stereotyping argument, finding instead that the history of the marriage stat-
ute “does not demonstrate that the definition of marriage as male-female can
itself be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”74  The court reasoned that while
certain repealed marriage statutes subordinated women to men, this did not
demonstrate that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was due
to sex-role assumptions.75
In contrast to the majority opinions, several state court concurring and
dissenting opinions have expounded upon sex discrimination arguments.  In
Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York, concurring and dissenting justices,
respectively, rejected their colleagues’ reliance on the “equal application”
theory in response to the facial sex discrimination argument.  In both Ver-
mont and Massachusetts, these justices went beyond the facial discrimina-
tion argument and found that restrictive marriage statutes were also
discriminatory on a sex stereotyping basis.  Only in New York has a high
court justice adopted the facial sex discrimination argument without also
reaching the sex stereotype argument.
In Baker, Justice Johnson reasoned that Vermont’s marriage challenge
presented “a straightforward case of sex discrimination.”76  She explained:
Dr. A and Dr. B both want to marry Ms. C, an X-ray technician.
Dr. A may do so because Dr. A is a man [but] Dr. B may not
because Dr. B is a woman.  Dr. A and Dr. B are people of opposite
sexes who are similarly situated in the sense that they both want to
marry a person of their choice.  The statute disqualifies Dr. B from
marriage solely on the basis of her sex and treats her different
from Dr. A, a man.  This is sex discrimination.77
Urging that “the sex-based classification contained in the marriage laws is
. . . a vestige of sex-role stereotyping that applies to both men and wo-
men,”78 Justice Johnson further reasoned that “uniting men and women to
celebrate the ‘complementarity’ of the sexes and providing male and female
role models for children’ [is] based on broad and vague generalizations
about the roles of men and women . . . .”79
In a concurring opinion in Goodridge, Justice Greaney of Massachu-
setts similarly adopted a sex discrimination theory, explaining:
As a factual matter, an individual’s choice of marital partner is
constrained because of his or her own sex.  Stated in particular
73 Id.
74 In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 709.
75 Id.
76 Baker, 744 A.2d at 905 (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
77 Id. at 906.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 909.
\\server05\productn\h\hlg\30-2\hlg407.txt unknown Seq: 18 26-JUL-07 12:01
478 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 30
terms, Hillary Goodridge cannot marry Julie Goodridge because
she (Hillary) is a woman.  Likewise, Gary Chalmers cannot marry
Richard Linnell because he (Gary) is a man.  Only their gender
prevents Hillary and Gary from marrying their chosen partners
under present law.80
Like Justice Johnson, Justice Greaney also moved beyond a mere facial sex
discrimination argument and into sex stereotype territory, adding that:
[The] case requires that we confront ingrained assumptions with
respect to historically accepted roles of men and women within the
institution of marriage and requires that we reexamine these as-
sumptions in light of the unequivocal language of art 1. [of the
Massachusetts Constitution], in order to ensure that the govern-
mental conduct challenged here conforms to the supreme charter
of our Commonwealth.81
Finally, Chief Judge Kaye, in her dissenting opinion in the New York
litigation, expressly adopted the facial sex discrimination argument and re-
jected the “equal application” theory by analogy to Loving:
The exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriages . . . dis-
criminates on the basis of sex . . . . [A] woman who seeks to
marry another woman is prevented from doing so on account of
her sex—that is, because she is not a man.  If she were, she would
be given a marriage license to marry that woman.  That the statu-
tory scheme applies equally to both sexes does not alter the con-
clusion that the classification here is based on sex.  The “equal
application” approach to equal protection analysis was expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Loving.82
Judge Kaye’s dissent is the only high court opinion since the Hawaii Su-
preme Court’s decision in Baehr that adopts a facial sex discrimination the-
ory without expressly connecting the facial discrimination to sex stereotypes
or historical gender-based inequalities within marriage.  Her dissent does,
however, adopt the analogy to Loving and perhaps thereby suggests a recog-
nition that the sex classifications in the New York marriage statute reflect
invidious discrimination.
Clearly, then, some justices on the states’ highest courts have under-
stood and found compelling the sex discrimination argument in favor of
marriage for same-sex couples.  Their acceptance of plaintiffs’ sex discrimi-
nation claims may derive from the justices’ connection of the facial sex clas-
sification with invidious sex discrimination based on harmful gender
80 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney,
J., concurring).
81 Id. at 973.
82 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 29 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
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stereotypes.  Since only a minority of justices have made this connection and
since only a minority of justices have favorably ruled based on a sex dis-
crimination theory, it is necessary to consider why the many justices ruling
against plaintiff couples, or ruling for plaintiff couples on other grounds,
find the sex discrimination argument unconvincing.  Such analysis may per-
mit litigants to strengthen the conceptual and factual connections between
the facial sex discrimination at work in restrictive marriage statutes and the
invidious sex stereotype discrimination perpetuated by such facial sex
discrimination.
Of course, we can only speculate as to why some justices have rejected
the sex discrimination argument.  Perhaps the justices do not recognize the
sex stereotyping at work in restrictive marriage statutes in the face of
changes in contemporary society (or even their own modern marriages).
Perhaps the justices, like many other citizens, do not think that the idea of
“male” and “female” role models for children are in fact based in sex ste-
reotypes.  Perhaps the justices are reluctant to brand marriage as a patriar-
chal or negative institution when they view “traditional” marriage as a
reasonable personal choice.  Regardless of which, if any, of these hypotheses
are correct, the truth of the matter is that many court majorities have missed
the very real analogy to Loving and have neglected the very real stereotypes
still at play in the maintenance and idealization of different-sex marriage.
As we will show below, the analogy to Loving is apt, and the stereotyping is
apparent even from the decisions themselves.
III. STRENGTHENING THE LOVING ANALOGY BY EXPLICITLY GROUNDING
THE FACIAL DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT IN A DISCUSSION OF
SEX STEREOTYPES
Koppelman, Law, and other scholars have articulated the connection
between sex discrimination and discrimination against lesbians and gay men
in largely theoretical terms, focusing on the overlap and slippage between
norms regulating gender and norms regulating sexuality.83  And, although
scholars and plaintiffs alike have consistently articulated a sex discrimina-
tion argument in support of marriage rights for lesbian and gay individuals,
the actual sex discrimination harm—that is, the harm caused by the sex clas-
83 See, e.g., Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, supra note 32, at 129 R
(“The two stigmas—sex-inappropriateness and homosexuality—are virtually inter-
changeable, and each is readily used as a metaphor for the other.”); Law, supra note 32, R
at 196 (“Homosexual relationships challenge the dichotomous concept of gender.  These
relationships challenge the notion that social traits, such as dominance and nurturance,
are naturally linked to one sex or the other.”); see also Jo Bennett, Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment, 6 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 23 (1996); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Lesbians in the Law: Sym-
posium Issue: Sex-Based Discrimination: Common Legacies and Common Challenges, 5
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 11, 21 (1995).
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sifications at issue—has remained rather abstract.84  The sex discrimination
argument has thus foundered on an “equal application” defense—that is,
that since gay men and lesbian women are “equally” harmed by the denial
of the opportunity to marry, there is no sex discrimination because men and
women are treated “equally.”  The decoupling of the facial sex discrimina-
tion argument and the sex stereotype discrimination argument may in some
sense have encouraged this result because the classifications themselves, that
is, the requirements that a man may only marry a woman and that a woman
may only marry a man, on their face seem to be relatively “harmless” from
a sex-discrimination perspective.
This Part and the following Part demonstrate that the analogy to Loving
can be strengthened by showing that the rationales used to justify the sex-
based classifications in the marriage statutes rely on gender-based stereo-
types that tend to perpetuate traditional gender hierarchies and limit the free-
dom of both women and men to choose how to structure their lives and their
relationships.  In other words, grounding the facial sex discrimination argu-
ment in a substantive discussion of the sex stereotypes at play can make the
sex discrimination caused by the use of sex-based classifications in the mar-
riage statutes much more real.  This approach makes clear that sex discrimi-
nation in marriage is not just a historical relic that has been largely erased
from marriage statutes; as demonstrated in Part IV, the sex stereotypes con-
tinue to have significant currency today.
As discussed above, plaintiffs’ counsel and amici curiae have generally
based the facial sex discrimination argument, in part, on the Court’s rejection
of the anti-miscegenation statute at issue in the landmark Supreme Court
case of Loving v. Virginia.85  Plaintiffs’ counsel and amici curiae have gener-
ally relied on Loving not only by analogy, but also as a rebuttal to the “equal
application” theory, since that theory was expressly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Loving.  Because the right to marry is an individual right, support-
ers argue, the individual’s right to marry her chosen spouse is infringed re-
gardless of the purportedly equal treatment of the implicated groups.  Each
individual is discriminated against on an individual basis.  In other words,
plaintiffs and amici curiae have responded to the “equal application” argu-
84 See, e.g., Andersen Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 47, at 2–3 (“Men and wo- R
men who fail to conform to gender norms are often equated with homosexuals (regardless
of their actual sexual orientation), and homosexuals and gender-non-conforming individ-
uals alike are stigmatized in ways that devalue the ‘female’ and the female’s ‘traditional’
role in the family.  Because it hides behind these notions of what roles are ‘proper’ in the
family—bolstering a system in which men are expected to conform to (dominant) ‘mas-
culine’ ideals and women to (subservient) ‘feminine’ ideals—the denial of the right to
marry to lesbian and gay couples is a particularly invidious form of gender-stereotype
discrimination.”); Law, supra note 32, at 197 (“[H]istorical justifications for condemna- R
tion of homosexuality are based on patriarchal cultural arrangements and value structures
that are no longer defensible.”).
85 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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ment by arguing that the fact of a sex-based classification, like the fact of a
race-based classification, is enough to require heightened scrutiny.
This argument has not been successful—despite ample support86—per-
haps because it overlooks much of the animating force behind the Loving
analogy.  The holding in Loving does not rely exclusively on the fundamen-
tal proposition that the right to marry an individual of one’s choice is an
individual right that cannot be denied based on purported “equal applica-
tion” to various racial groups.  The decision also turned on the Court’s ex-
plicit recognition that the anti-miscegenation law at stake in Loving was
designed to perpetuate white supremacy.  First, the Court recognized that the
anti-miscegenation law relied on racial classifications and thus triggered
strict scrutiny, notwithstanding the so-called “equal application.”87  Then,
the Court determined that the classifications at issue were not justified by a
sufficiently compelling governmental interest, explicitly on the grounds that
they were “measures designed to maintain White Supremacy” and that they
had “no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial dis-
86 In fact, Loving followed earlier Supreme Court decisions that had likewise rejected
“equal application” arguments and, significantly, had done so without requiring a show-
ing that the challenged classification perpetuated white supremacy.  For example, in Shel-
ley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court held that judicial enforcement of racial
covenants violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The Court specifically rejected a claim
that there was no Equal Protection Clause violation because courts would enforce equally
covenants against blacks and covenants against whites on the grounds that “[t]he rights
created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to
the individual.” Id. at 21–22.  Likewise, in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964),
the Court struck down a statute that specifically criminalized cohabitation by an unmar-
ried white woman and black man or black woman and white man.  While noting the
“equal application” of the statute, the Court held that “[j]udicial inquiry under the Equal
Protection Clause . . . does not end with a showing of equal application among the mem-
bers of the class defined by the legislation.  The courts must reach and determine the
question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its pur-
pose—in this case, whether there is an arbitrary or invidious discrimination between
those classes covered by Florida’s cohabitation law and those excluded.” Id. at 191.
Thus, the reliance by some courts on the “white supremacy” language in Loving to dis-
tinguish the racial classifications in Loving from the sex classifications in the statutes
implicated in the current marriage cases is misplaced.  Under Loving and contemporane-
ous Supreme Court decisions, the fact of suspect classifications, even when purportedly
“equally applied,” is sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny.  Therefore, even though
the marriage restrictions apply “equally” to women and men, they should be recognized
as sex-based classifications and should only be upheld upon a showing that the classifica-
tions meet the level of heightened scrutiny applied to sex-based classifications under the
specific state’s law.  Nonetheless, given the emphasis that the Loving Court placed on the
anti-miscegenation statute’s perpetuation of racial hierarchies, it is perhaps not surprising
that contemporary courts have rejected the Loving analogy in the marriage cases without
a stronger showing that the statutes tend to perpetuate gender-based hierarchies or sex-
based stereotypes.  Thus, without suggesting that the plaintiffs in such cases are incorrect
to argue that Loving and other cases make clear that “equal application” of a discrimina-
tory classification does not exempt a statute from heightened scrutiny, we suggest in this
Part that the Loving analogy will be more persuasive if the connection between the sex
classifications at issue and the perpetuation of sex-based stereotypes is made more
apparent.
87 Loving, 388 U.S. at 8–9.
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crimination.”88  The Court’s language supporting marriage as a fundamental
individual right came later in the decision, as part of the Court’s due process
analysis.89  In other words, within the discrimination framework set forth in
Loving, the equal protection violation derived from the statute’s invidious
discrimination—that the classifications at issue were justified by nothing
other than white supremacy.  Thus, an understanding of the sex stereotypes
perpetuating gender-differentiated family roles at stake in the current mar-
riage debate (and thus the invidious sex discrimination underlying restrictive
marriage statutes) strengthens the sex discrimination-based “Loving anal-
ogy” because it is sex stereotypes, and their effect of limiting freedom of
individuals and subordinating women, that give the discrimination analogy
its full effect.90
This is not merely a theoretical concern.  Rather, as discussed above,
courts faced with a sex discrimination claim in several cases have rejected
the facial sex discrimination argument and the Loving analogy on the
grounds that Loving was about white supremacy and that the marriage stat-
utes, by contrast, are not about gender-based hierarchies.91  But these deci-
sions overlook, as many litigants have, the inextricable connection between
the facial sex discrimination of restrictive marriage statutes and the sex ste-
88 Id. at 11.
89 Id. at 12 (“These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process
of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom
to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. . . . [T]he freedom to marry, or not marry, a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
90 By contrast, the California Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Perez v. Sharp,
198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948), the first state supreme court decision striking down a state
miscegenation law on equal protection grounds, emphasized the individual interests at
stake in rejecting the equal application argument:
[T]he decisive question . . . is not whether different races, each considered as a
group, are equally treated.  The right to marry is the right of individuals, not of
racial groups.  The equal protection clause [sic] of the United States Constitution
does not refer to rights of the Negro race, the Caucasian race, or any other race,
but to the rights of individuals.
Id. at 20.  Loving, decided almost twenty years later, did not follow this model.  More
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases have increasingly emphasized an individual interest in
not being categorized on the basis of racial classifications as part of a move towards a
formal anti-classification analysis rather than the more substantive anti-subordination
analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 99–100. R
91 See supra text accompanying notes 67–71.  There is also a small yet significant R
body of academic literature that rejects same-sex couples’ analogy to Loving. See, e.g.,
David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of
Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998); Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer:
Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 239 (1998); Lynn D.
Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU
L. REV. 1 (1996).  As William Eskridge has explained, the sex discrimination argument
for gay rights might at first glance appear unconvincing partly because it seems to have a
“transvestic quality, dressing up gay rights in sex equality garb.”  William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equity, 74 IND. L.J. 1085, 1110 (1999).  Eskridge,
however, then discusses how “antihomosexual attitudes are connected with attitudes se-
questering women in traditional gender roles.” Id.
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reotypes such statutes rely upon and perpetuate.  As Andrew Koppelman has
persuasively argued, homosexuality does not threaten the family itself but
rather only a “traditional ideology of the family . . . in which men, but not
women, belong to the public world of work and are not so much members as
owners of their families, while women, but not men, should rear children,
manage homes, and obey their husbands.”92  Making the connections be-
tween the restrictive marriage statutes and sex stereotypes (which tend to
subordinate women) implicit in the rationales offered to justify those restric-
tions more clear would put plaintiffs’ claims in line with Loving and elevate
the Loving analogy above the mere rejection of the “equal application”
theory.
Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon’s analysis of Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S.
Supreme Court case finding unconstitutional a state statute that criminalized
homosexual (but not heterosexual) sodomy, demonstrates how a “substan-
tive” equal protection analysis based on Loving could apply in this context.93
MacKinnon argues that “[t]he substantive sex equality question . . . is the
social question of whether a law and its application institutionalize the ‘gen-
der caste’ system of sex: male dominance.”94  Therefore,
[a] substantive sex equality approach asks not whether men and
women are the same or different, are treated the same or differ-
ently, and whether the two fit, although that can indicate a substan-
tive problem.  It asks fundamentally whether a law promotes
equality or inequality on the basis of sex in a domain in which the
sexes are socially unequal, specifically whether gender hierarchy
and sex-based dominance, or its progressive dissolution, is
promoted.95
Moving MacKinnon’s analogy from anti-sodomy laws to marriage statutes
shows how a substantive sex equality approach to marriage statutes
could proceed much as the Court did in Loving v. Virginia: as anti-
miscegenation laws discriminate on the basis of race to maintain
traditional racial and ethnic divisions to subordinate nonwhite peo-
ple to maintain white supremacy, [marriage] laws discriminate on
the basis of sex to maintain traditional sex and gender roles to
subordinate women to maintain male supremacy.96
92 Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 32, at 158. R
93 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 1085
(2004).  Interestingly, the four dissenting justices in the now-discredited Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) decision, emphasized the relevance of Loving to consideration
of an anti-sodomy statute.  As Justice Blackmun explained, “the parallel between Loving
and this case is almost uncanny.” Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 n.5 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
94 MacKinnon, supra note 93, at 1085. R
95 Id. at 1085–86.
96 Id. at 1086.
\\server05\productn\h\hlg\30-2\hlg407.txt unknown Seq: 24 26-JUL-07 12:01
484 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 30
A court faced with a challenge to a restrictive marriage statute could find the
statute to be “a facially sex-based means of institutionalizing compulsory
heterosexuality, an institution of male supremacy, in ways that hurt both
sexes on the basis of their sex.”97  In this conceptualization, “[h]omophobia
would be understood as a reflex of male dominant ideology against chal-
lenges to the heterosexually gendered sexuality that is made compulsory to
keep women sexually for men and men sexually inviolable.”98
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court and most (or maybe all) state su-
preme courts have not endorsed the connection between heterosexism and
sexism and the extent to which both work to enforce the subordination of
women.  Indeed, as many commentators have recognized, the Supreme
Court, and state courts following its lead, have seemed to reject the substan-
tive anti-subordination approach to equal protection analysis in general.99
The trend, particularly in race discrimination cases, has clearly been to move
to a formal anti-classification analysis where the fact of the classification
causes a presumptive holding of unconstitutionality and the injury caused is
an individual injury.  It is this “color-blind” approach that has given rise to
successful “reverse” discrimination suits and the virtual demise of affirma-
tive action outside of the education context.100
Sex discrimination jurisprudence, however, has developed somewhat
differently from race discrimination jurisprudence; in sex discrimination
cases, there is a much stronger focus on whether sex-based classifications
rely on stereotypes and a recognition that such stereotypes may perpetuate
gender hierarchies.  Although the Supreme Court has not adopted a substan-
tive anti-subordination approach, and it is clear (and appropriate) that state
97 Id. at 1087.
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951,
1009 (2002) (“Current Supreme Court doctrine understands equal protection as an an-
tidiscrimination principle rather than an antisubordination principle.”); Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1991) (“The
modern Court has moved away from . . . notions of race that recognize the diverging
historical experiences of Black and white Americans . . . . In place of these concepts, the
Court relies increasingly on the formal-race concept of race, a vision of race as uncon-
nected to the historical reality of Black oppression.”). But see Reva B. Siegel, Brown at
Fifty: Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1538–44 (2004) (arguing that while
often masked, antisubordination concerns remain a factor in modern equal protection
jurisprudence, particularly in the diversity rationale for affirmative action decisions); id.
at 1473 n.10 (gathering other commentary suggesting antisubordination analysis contin-
ues to play a role in modern equal protection decisions).
100 It is on this basis that the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down race-based affirm-
ative action plans as evidence of so-called “reverse discrimination.” See, e.g., Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding unconstitutional city’s affirmative ac-
tion plan for awarding municipal construction contracts); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that a federal affirmative action plan for awarding
highway contracts was subject to strict scrutiny, and remanding to determine whether the
challenged program satisfied this standard).
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policies that discriminate against men are actionable,101 it is also well estab-
lished under modern sex discrimination jurisprudence that state policies
based on sex stereotypes are unconstitutional.102  Thirty years ago in Stanton
v. Stanton,103 in striking down a statute that required parents to support their
sons until they turned twenty-one but their daughters only until they turned
eighteen, the Court recognized that government policies cannot be based on
stereotypical gender roles, such as the expectation that “the female [is] des-
tined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for
the marketplace and the world of ideas.”104  Likewise, a few years later, the
Court found a social security program that provided benefits to children
whose fathers were unemployed but not to children whose mothers were
unemployed unconstitutional because it was “part of the ‘baggage of sexual
stereotypes’ that presumes the father has the ‘primary responsibility to pro-
vide a home and its essentials,’ while the mother is the ‘center of home and
family life.’” 105
More recent sex discrimination decisions are similarly grounded in sex
stereotyping concerns.  A gender-based classification triggers heightened
scrutiny that
must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abil-
ities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining
whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereo-
typic notions.  Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or
“protect” members of one gender because they are presumed to
suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the ob-
jective itself is illegitimate.106
Courts must scrutinize classifications based on sex by engaging in “reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.”107
Plaintiffs do not need to show that the government policy at issue was moti-
101 Indeed, several of the most important sex discrimination cases decided by the
Supreme Court, including many of the groundbreaking cases brought by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg when she was an attorney at the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, involved chal-
lenges to statutes that seemed to protect or privilege women but actually reinforced tradi-
tional stereotypical gender roles. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(challenge to military requirement that men but not women prove economic dependency
to receive spousal benefits); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (challenge to
Social Security Act provision that denied widowed fathers benefits afforded to widowed
mothers).
102 See Mary Ann Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional
Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447,
1449–50 (2000).
103 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
104 Id. at 14–15.
105 Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (citations omitted).
106 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982) (emphasis
added).
107 Id. at 726.
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vated by a desire to subordinate or discriminate against women.  Thus, for
example, the Court was able to find that permitting only women to attend a
nursing school violated equal protection without showing that the single-sex
nature of the school was motivated by discriminatory intent.108
A statute or government policy based on sex stereotypes is unconstitu-
tional even if the generalizations it relies upon remain true for many, or even
most, women.  Statutes or government policies that rely on “overbroad gen-
eralizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females” are invalid.109  Thus, although the Court in United States v.
Virginia recognized that many women would not want to be educated in the
brutal adversative training approach used by the Virginia Military Institute,
failure to admit those women who did desire to attend the school violated the
Equal Protection Clause.110  Citing Loving, the Court recognized that
“[s]upposed ‘inherent differences’ are no longer accepted as a ground for
race or national origin classifications.”111  Although the Court recognized
that “physical differences” between the sexes are enduring, it emphasized
that sex-based classifications cannot be used to “create or perpetuate the
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”112  State sex discrimina-
tion analysis often parallels, or goes even further than, these federal
propositions.113
Close consideration of Loving and the Court’s treatment of the “equal
application” defense in that case, and the placement of that analysis within
modern sex discrimination jurisprudence, demonstrates how the Loving anal-
ogy can be used more effectively in cases challenging different-sex require-
ments in marriage statutes. Loving depended on two propositions: that racial
classifications, not withstanding their “equal application,” triggered strict
108 The state had argued that the single-sex nature of the school was intended to com-
pensate for discrimination against women. Id.  Without foreclosing the possibility of
potentially upholding gender-based classifications that “intentionally and directly as-
sist[ ] members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened,” id. at 728, the Court
rejected the claimed rationale in this case and emphasized that any such analysis had to
probe the real reasons for a classification and discounted the state’s claim here on the
ground that maintaining the school as single-sex “tend[ed] to perpetuate the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job.” Id. at 729.
109 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
110 Id. at 542.
111 Id. at 533 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
112 Id. at 533–34.  This language suggests a concern with antisubordination principles
that is intertwined with sex stereotype analysis. Id.; see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (“[T]he gender stereotype . . . that women’s family
duties trump those of the workplace . . . has historically produced discrimination in the
hiring and promotion of women.”).
113 See, e.g., Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, 865 (N.J. 1995) (stating that “gen-
der neutrality is evident in the laws as administered by the courts of New Jersey” (quot-
ing K.K. v. G., 530 A.2d 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987))); State v. Burch, 830 P.2d
357, 362 (Wash. 1992) (“The protection provided by the [Washington] ERA go beyond
those of the equal protection guaranty under the federal constitution.”); Kiore v. Metro
Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 202 (Cal. 1985) (“[C]lassifications based on sex are considered
‘suspect’ for purposes of equal protection analysis under the California Constitution.”).
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scrutiny, and that the anti-miscegenation statute’s underlying purpose of
maintaining white supremacy could not pass such strict scrutiny.  In the sex
context, modern state supreme courts have routinely rejected the Loving
analogy on the ground that anti-miscegenation statutes were intended to pre-
serve white supremacy but marriage statutes, they contend, are not intended
to preserve, and do not have the effect of preserving, male supremacy.  Sex
discrimination jurisprudence offers a response by making clear that govern-
ment classifications based on sex stereotypes (even if purportedly benefiting
women) are presumptively unconstitutional.  Thus, the more comprehensive
Loving analogy depends on showing that the sex classifications, notwith-
standing their purported “equal application,” trigger heightened scrutiny (in-
termediate or, in some states, strict), and that the government objectives
served by the restrictions at issue rely on sex stereotypes, that is, on “over-
broad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females,” which cannot withstand such heightened scrutiny.114  In
other words, litigants in these cases must more fully expose the underlying
sex stereotypes that bolster opposition to permitting same-sex couples to
marry.
IV. EXPOSING THE SEX STEREOTYPES UNDERLYING THE RATIONALES FOR
LIMITING MARRIAGE TO DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES AND OTHER
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED EFFORTS TO PROMOTE
“TRADITIONAL” MARRIAGE
Courts will perhaps become more convinced of the validity of a sex
discrimination claim in favor of marriage for same-sex couples, and the con-
comitant connection to the substantive discrimination addressed in Loving, if
they come to understand the extent to which sex stereotypes are at play in
recent marriage jurisprudence and that these stereotypes inflict real harm on
both women and men.  Sex stereotypes are more prevalent, and more invidi-
ous, than court majorities would have us believe.  In fact, recent decisions
rely on sex-stereotyped assumptions that can be loosely categorized into
three overlapping types.115  The first assumes that children need or should
114 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 516.
115 The restrictive nature of the stereotypes at play is even clearer in many of the
amicus briefs submitted in support of limiting marriage to different-sex couples than in
the judicial opinions.  Significantly, the state defendants in these cases often disavow the
more extreme of the arguments put forth by amici; indeed, many must because their
states have formally adopted policies permitting same-sex couples to adopt or foster par-
ent children, making it difficult (at best) to argue that such couples necessarily are sub-
optimal parents. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 724 n.33 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (noting that the California Attorney General expressly disavowed arguments
put forth by amici suggesting families headed by different-sex parents are better for chil-
dren as “contrary to California policy”).  Nonetheless, the judges and justices deciding
these cases often rely on the sex stereotyped arguments made explicitly by amici in their
briefs. See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 269 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(noting that although the New Jersey Attorney General had disclaimed reliance upon
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have parent figures of different genders.  The second assumes that men and
women are temperamentally different and should (and do) play different,
complementary roles in marriage and family.  The third assumes that mar-
riage is required to protect women who would otherwise be vulnerable to
economic and sexual instability and dependence upon men, particularly in
light of the possibility that heterosexual relationships can yield children acci-
dentally.  These same themes emerge in other recent developments of gov-
ernment programs that seek to “protect” or “encourage” heterosexual,
traditional marriage using government funding.
The unquestioned reliance on gender-based stereotypes as justifying the
different-sex requirements in marriage laws stands in sharp contrast to recent
developments in family law and constitutional law.  Spurred by sex discrimi-
nation claims and changing societal norms, explicit sex-based classifications
and presumptions have been removed in custody, alimony, and other areas
of law that previously relied on gender stereotypes.116  Thus, as has been
noted by courts considering claims by same-sex couples seeking to marry,
most state family law has no gender-based distinctions remaining beyond the
specification that marriage itself must be between a man and a woman.  Al-
though courts have sometimes used this fact as a basis to deny the sex dis-
crimination argument,117 recognizing the sex stereotypes underlying the so-
called “rational” justifications imputed to state legislatures as a basis for
limiting marriage to different-sex couples shows the fallacy of this reason-
ing.  That is, as noted above, the Supreme Court has cautioned that in assess-
ing the constitutionality of sex-based classifications, “[c]are must be taken
in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and ster-
eotypic notions.”118  If the statutory objectives ascribed to the different-sex
requirement in marriage rely upon such archaic and stereotypic notions, they
should be properly recognized as discriminatory.  Individuals, of course,
may choose to structure their relationships in accordance with traditional
gender roles.  The government, however, may not rely upon such generaliza-
tions as a justification for sex-based classifications.
Thus, looking at the rationales offered to justify different-sex require-
ments in marriage statutes through the lens of sex discrimination jurispru-
dence, which clearly holds that sex-based stereotypes are insufficient to
justify government use of sex-based classifications, yields two important
promotion of procreation and creating the “optimal environment” for raising children,
the court considered them to be properly presented for consideration by the amicus brief-
ing), overruled in part by Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
116 See generally Appleton, supra note 16, at 110–16 (discussing a move toward gen- R
der-neutral rules in family law on such issues as child custody, post-dissolution support,
premarital contract enforcement, and age requirements for marriage, as well as in anti-
discrimination and employment law).
117 See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999).
118 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982).
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benefits.119  First, it helps shore up the strategically advantageous sex dis-
crimination argument by making the “harm” caused by the sex-based classi-
fications at issue much more apparent.  This may increase the likelihood that
courts will recognize that the statutes’ use of classifications, notwithstanding
their “equal application,” does in fact require heightened scrutiny and that
the proffered justifications cannot withstand such scrutiny.
Second, identifying the underlying sex stereotypes helps discredit the
justifications put forward for different-sex requirements more generally.
This increases the likelihood that even a court that refuses to apply height-
ened scrutiny to the sex-based classifications employed by a marriage statute
would determine that different-sex requirements in marriage statutes fail to
satisfy even rational basis review.  In other words, recognizing that many of
the purported justifications for these requirements are largely or entirely
based on sex stereotypes makes clear that such justifications cannot be an
appropriate basis for government action, even if legislators and others sin-
cerely believe in their validity.  Thus, discussion of the sex stereotypes at
play can expose the extent to which continuing to limit marriage to different-
sex couples is not justified by legitimate government objectives, but rather
reflects an unjustifiable effort to make same-sex couples unequal to all other
couples.120
A. Different-Gender Role Models for Children
While there are studies demonstrating that children (unsurprisingly)
benefit from living with two loving parents, such research also consistently
finds that children living in same-sex-couple-headed households do as well
119 While we suggest focusing on the harm that perpetuation of gender stereotypes in
the context of the same-sex marriage debates causes to women (and potentially men) who
seek to challenge traditional gender roles, we understand that restrictive marriage statutes
are more harmful to lesbians and gay men than they are to women generally. Cf. Stein,
supra note 16 (arguing that laws limiting gay and lesbian rights are primarily motivated R
by homophobia and primarily harm gay men and lesbian women and that focusing on
sexism and harm to women misstates the primary harm).  Of course, restrictive marriage
statutes also harm bisexuals, who often are excluded from any legal or political discus-
sion of marriage rights. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure,
52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000).
120 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (concluding that state constitu-
tional amendment prohibiting protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation failed to satisfy rational basis review because the amendment “classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else”).  We are not suggesting that when originally passed, different-sex requirements in
marriage statutes were intended primarily to foreclose marriage between individuals of
the same sex.  In fact, the sex-specific classifications in marriage statutes were often
linked to different roles or responsibilities (such as economic support or child-rearing)
within marriage or upon the dissolution of marriage.  These sex-based distinctions, how-
ever, have been systematically removed from marriage statutes because they relied on
sex-based stereotypes, such as a presumption that wives are financially dependent on
their husbands or that mothers are preferable to fathers as primary caretakers for children.
See generally Appleton, supra note 16, at 110–16. R
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as those living in different-sex-couple-headed households.121  Nevertheless,
courts in the marriage cases have fallen back on an essentialized understand-
ing of gender roles to hold that legislatures may assume that children do best
with a “mother” and a “father” and that male and female parents, simply by
virtue of their sex, play significantly different roles for their children.122  For
example, in Hernandez, the New York Court of Appeals held that “the Leg-
islature could rationally proceed on the common-sense premise that children
will do best with a mother and father in the home.”123 Moreover, the court
noted that “[i]ntuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from
having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man
and a woman are like.”124
This rationale was also relied upon in both the plurality opinion and
Justice Johnson’s concurrence in the Andersen decision from Washington
121 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, APA POLICY STATEMENT: RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, PARENTS, AND CHILDREN (2004) (“[R]esearch has shown that adjustment,
development, and psychological well-being of children is unrelated to parental sexual
orientation and that the children of lesbian and gay parents are as likely as those of
heterosexual parents to flourish.”); E.C. Perrin & Comm. on Psychol. Aspects of Child &
Family Health, Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex
Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341, 341 (2002) (“Children who grow up with 1 or 2 gay and/or
lesbian parents fare as well in emotional, cognitive, social, and sexual functioning as do
children whose parents are heterosexual.”); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How)
Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 176 (2001)
(“[E]very relevant study to date shows that parental sexual orientation per se has no
measurable effect on the quality of parent-child relationships or on children’s mental
health or social adjustment.”).
122 An argument that children are ideally raised by “a” mother and “a” father is
distinct from the argument (also often put forward in the same-sex marriage jurispru-
dence, and often intertwined with a discussion of male and female role models, as well as
the “responsible procreation” arguments discussed infra text accompanying notes
149–162) that children are ideally raised by their biological parents. Although the latter R
by definition requires that a child is raised by a specific mother and a specific father, the
former raises greater sex discrimination concerns by ascribing the significant benefit to
children as relating to the parental figure’s gender, not to a genetic connection.  An article
cited positively by both the Morrison and Standhardt courts helps make this distinction
clear.  In “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State
Interests in Marital Procreation, Lynn Wardle argues against legalizing same-sex mar-
riage on the grounds that it would weaken the nexus between procreation and parenting,
stating, more broadly:
On the basis of what we know about the tremendous disadvantages of children
who grow up without both a mom and dad in the home, it would not be wise
public policy to encourage the deliberate procreation of intentionally semi-or-
phaned, parentally deprived children.  To endorse and thus encourage the rearing
of children in an environment in which there is the deliberate rejection of not
‘just’ the other procreative parent, but all parents of that gender, does not seem
very wise or prudent.  The potential for increased social disorder if same-sex mar-
riage is legalized is profound.
Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of
State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 798 (2001)
(emphasis added).
123 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006).
124 Id. at 7.
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state.125  The plurality opinion stated relatively briefly that the legislature had
heard testimony arguing that children “tend to thrive in families consisting
of a father, mother, and their biological children” and that “the legislature
was entitled to believe that providing that only opposite sex-couples may
marry will encourage procreation and child-rearing in a ‘traditional’ nuclear
family where children tend to thrive.”126  Justice Johnson’s concurrence was
more explicit about the significance of gender-based stereotypes in this con-
text, arguing that “because of nonfungible differences between men and wo-
men,” since “female couple households are necessarily fatherless and male
couple households are necessarily motherless[,] [e]ach of these differences
from the optimum mother/father setting for family life may offer distinctive
disadvantages.”127
Likewise, Justice Cordy, dissenting in the Goodridge decision from
Massachusetts,128 argued that the state “could rationally conclude that a fam-
ily environment with married opposite-sex parents remains the optimal so-
cial structure in which to bear children, and that the raising of children by
same-sex couples, who . . . cannot provide children with a parental authority
figure of each gender, presents an alternative structure for child rearing that
has not proven itself.”129  And in the now-overruled Appellate Division deci-
sion in the New Jersey litigation, the court likewise reflexively stated that
“marriage between a man and woman” provides “the ideal environment for
raising children,” without acknowledging that such an assertion depends
upon adherence to well-defined, stereotypical gender roles.130
The court decisions rely on conclusory statements that children benefit
from living with a male and a female role model without specifying the
supposed different roles that the man and woman play in the family solely
by virtue of their sex.  Indeed, it is such a familiar concept that it may be
difficult to recognize that an insistence that children need “mothers” and
“fathers,” or “male” and “female” role models, is in fact a form of sex
stereotyping because it ascribes significant sex-based differences to the role
that each parent plays.  However, amicus briefs submitted in support of re-
strictive marriage statutes have discussed the need for children to have male
and female role models in a way that makes clear the concrete harm that
such justifications pose to women (and to men); these briefs have exposed
the extent to which the male and female “role model” justification reflects
stereotypical beliefs about the difference between men’s and women’s “na-
125 See supra text accompanying notes 63–65, 72–73. R
126 Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006).
127 Id. at 1005–06 (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment).
128 See supra text accompanying note 60. R
129 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 999–1000 (Mass. 2003)
(Cordy, J., dissenting).
130 Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 269 (N.J. App. Div. 2005), overruled in part by
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
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tures.”131  For example, the American Center for Law and Justice Northeast
brief in the California state litigation argued that because of “innate differ-
ences between men and women,” each sex makes a “unique contribution”
in childrearing.132  The “unique” contributions of fathers include not only
the “role model of husband/father” but also (purportedly) “intelligence/
problem solving skills,” “responsibility and autonomy,”133 and “initiative,
risk taking and independence.”134  Mothers, by contrast, provide love that is
“[un]conditional, comforting, and the foundation of human attachment fos-
tering empathic character in children.”135  The differences ascribed to the
female and male role models reflect deep-seated stereotypes regarding male
and female characteristics that are properly condemned as sex discrimination
because they have so often been used as the basis to deny opportunities to
women.136
B. Gender as a Complementary Dichotomy Within Marriage
In a closely related argument, courts justify legislatures’ limitation of
marriage to different-sex couples by suggesting that different-sex marriage is
necessary and appropriate because women and men play opposite and com-
131 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Center for Law & Justice Northeast,
Inc. at 23–25, In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (Nos.
A110651, A110652); Brief of Amici Curiae The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints et al. at 9, In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No.
A110449); Brief of Amici Curiae Monmouth Plastics, Corp. and John M. Bonforte Sr. at
29–32, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. 58,389).
132 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Center for Law & Justice Northeast, Inc., supra
note 131, at 23. R
133 Id. at 25.
134 Id. at 24 (quoting DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 144, 146 (1996)).
135 Id. (quoting DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR
MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 219 (1995)).
136 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (In holding that
sex stereotypes in employment context can state claim of sex discrimination under Title
VII, the Court explained that “[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness in women
but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.”).
Ironically, the influential conservative organization Focus on the Family uses the fact that
women historically have had less access to the labor market as a justification for oppos-
ing marriage for same-sex couples, arguing that children, “especially boys,” need “fa-
thers” to help connect them to the labor market. See Glenn T. Stanton, Why Children
Need Father-Love and Mother-Love, Part 2, available at http://www.family.org/social
issues/A000000635.cfm (last visited May 27, 2007) (“Fathers help connect their children,
[sic] (especially boys) to job markets as they enter adulthood.  This is because fathers,
more than mothers, are likely to have the kinds of diverse community connections needed
to help young adults get their first jobs.  They are also more likely [sic] have the motiva-
tion to make sure their children make these connections.”).  Echoing the kind of argu-
ments found in the amici curiae briefs, Stanton also contends that children need parents
of different genders based on such platitudes as “[f]athers do ‘man things’ and women
do ‘lady things,’” id.; “fathers push limits; mothers encourage security,” Glenn T. Stan-
ton, Why Children Need Father-Love and Mother-Love, Part 1, http://www.family.org/
socialissues/A000001142.cfm (last visited May 27, 2007) (“children need mom’s softness
as well as dad’s roughhousing”).
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plementary roles within marriage, again, simply by virtue of their gender.
This rationale, hearkening back to the “separate spheres” conception long
discredited, likewise essentializes gender differences in a way that does not
comport with modern equal protection law.137  This rationale is most promi-
nent in Justice Parrillo’s concurrence in the (now overruled) Appellate Divi-
sion decision in the New Jersey litigation, which relied on what he labeled
“the fact of sexual difference.”138  Relying heavily on an article by commen-
tator Monte Stewart, Justice Parillo suggested that these presumed inherent
and natural differences fuel assumptions not only regarding the roles that
men and women should (and, by assumption, do) perform in childrearing, as
discussed above, but also in the broader context of marriage and family
life.139  Specifically, Justice Parrillo pointed to “the enormous tide of hetero-
sexual desire,” “the massive significance of male female bonding,” “the
unique social ecology of heterosexual parenting,” and the “rich genealogical
nature of heterosexual family ties.”140  To Justice Parrillo, the “specialness”
of marriage derives from its “opposite-sex feature,” a feature that relies on
the stereotypical assumptions that the marriage and family roles of women
and men are well-defined and contrasting.141  In Morrison v. Sadler, the Indi-
ana Court of Appeal likewise justified the state’s interest in allowing only
different-sex marriages by relying on the same article by Monte Stewart and
explaining that Stewart “correctly notes” the “deep logic” of “man/woman
intercourse.”142
137 In fact, as noted supra note 60, the Goodridge majority rejected Justice Cordy’s R
reliance on marriage as promoting the “‘optimal’ mother and father setting for child
rearing,” by specifically noting that it “hews perilously close to the argument, long repu-
diated by the Legislature and the courts, that men and women are so innately and funda-
mentally different that their respective ‘proper spheres’ can be rigidly and universally
delineated.”  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 n.28 (Mass. 2003).
138 Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 276–77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parrillo,
J., concurring), modified in part, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).  For a discussion and critique
of the United States Supreme Court’s reliance on “real differences” based on sex, see
David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1002–03 (2002).
139 Id. at 277 (citing Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN.
J. FAM. L. 11, 80 (2004)).
140 Id. at 276.
141 Id. at 277.  For a discussion of non-judicial appeals to the “specialness” of hetero-
sexual marriage, see David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It Marriage”:  The First Amend-
ment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource,  74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 947–48 (2001).
142 Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Stewart, supra
note 139, at 47).  Justice Johnson, concurring in the Andersen judgment, also suggests in R
passing that the “complementary nature of the sexes” is a rational basis for limiting
marriage to different-sex couples, though his opinion focuses more specifically on their
procreative capacity.  Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1002 (Wash. 2006) (John-
son, J., concurring in judgment).  For an articulation and critique of the natural law argu-
ments for gender complementarity used by opponents of same-sex marriage, see Andrew
Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 51, 62–70 (1997).
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Stewart made similar arguments in a brief he authored that was submit-
ted in the California litigation.143  Other amicus briefs similarly assume the
“fact” of sexual difference or understand marriage as necessary for bridging
a sexual divide.  For example, the far-right Family Research Council con-
tended that “[t]he profound and complementary nature of the union of man
and woman that constitutes a marriage is at issue.”144  A brief submitted by
conservative religious groups suggested that marriage “bridges the male-
female divide,”145 and a socially-conservative student organization at
Princeton University likewise characterized marriage as necessary to man-
age “opposite-sex relationships of ‘bridging the sex divide’ in the interest of
men, women, and their children.”146
Indeed, most surprisingly, a few of the amici argued that the longstand-
ing exclusion of women from public life is a reason to preserve different-sex
marriage.  The United Families International brief (authored by Monte Stew-
art), for example, celebrated marriage as the “only important social institu-
tion in which women have always been necessary participants.”147  This, of
course, ignores that women were relegated to the private sphere by legisla-
tion and widespread discrimination against them when they tried to leave
that private sphere.  It also ignores the gendered hierarchy of traditional
marriage, which included rules, such as coverture, under which the married
woman ceased to exist as a person with a separate legal identity from her
husband, and chastisement, which granted husbands the legal entitlement to
use physical force to discipline their wives.  Thus, to celebrate marriage as
the only institution in which women have always been necessary participants
as a statement of its value for women is ironic, at best.
C. Marriage as Protection for Vulnerable Women from
Irresponsible Men
Many advocates of limiting marriage to different-sex couples argue that
marriage encourages “responsible procreation” and thereby protects vulner-
able women and children.  In judicial opinions, and to some extent in amicus
briefing, this rationale generally relies primarily on the fact that male-female
intercourse is the only form of sexual intercourse that can “naturally” (and
143 Brief of Amici Curiae United Families International and Family Leader Founda-
tion at 14–18, In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No.
A110449).
144 Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council at 13, Andersen v. King County,
138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1).
145 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints et al.,
supra note 131, at 10. R
146 Brief of Amici Curiae Anscombe Society at Princeton University at 15, Lewis v.
Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (N.J. 2006) (No. 58,398).
147 Brief of Amici Curiae United Families International and Family Leader Founda-
tion, supra note 143, at 21 (quoting Camille S. Williams, Women, Equality, and the Fed- R
eral Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 487, 487 (2006) (paper presented at
Symposium: A Federal Marriage Amendment, Brigham Young Univ. (Sept. 9, 2005))).
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thus, accidentally) result in children.  Although not explicitly “gendered,”
the court in Goodridge noted correctly in rejecting this argument that “[t]he
‘marriage is procreation’ argument singles out the one unbridgeable differ-
ence between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that differ-
ence into the essence of legal marriage.”148  Moreover, as further explained
below, the argument actually relies on gendered conceptions: without mar-
riage, men are unlikely or unwilling to be involved with or financially sup-
port their children, and “vulnerable” women therefore need the state to
promote heterosexual marriage to strengthen the bond between fathers,
mothers, and children.
The “responsible procreation” rationale has been the predominant justi-
fication in many of the court decisions denying same-sex couples the right to
marry.  For example, in Hernandez, the New York court declared that the
legislature could “rationally decide that, for the welfare of children, it is
more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex
than in same-sex relationships [because] heterosexual intercourse has a nat-
ural tendency to lead to the birth of children [but] homosexual intercourse
does not.”149  The Andersen plurality likewise found that such “responsible
procreation” arguments satisfied rational basis review, citing arguments put
forward by the state that “no other relationship has the power to create,
without third party involvement, a child biologically related to both par-
ents,” and observing that the state may have “found that encouraging mar-
riage for opposite-sex couples who may have relationships is preferable to
having children raised by unmarried parents.”150  Justice Johnson’s concur-
rence goes further, explicitly announcing that “less stable homes equate to
higher welfare and other burdens on the State” and that therefore, since
“[u]nlike same-sex couples, only opposite sex couples may experience un-
intentional or unplanned procreation,” “[s]tate sanctioned marriage as a
union of one man and one woman” serves a “‘private welfare’ purpose” of
encouraging couples to enter into a stable relationship prior to having
children.”151
Likewise, in Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Mari-
copa,152 the intermediate Arizona court denied plaintiffs’ claim to marriage
and found that the state had a valid and rational interest in “encouraging
procreation and child-rearing within the stable environment traditionally as-
sociated with marriage.”153  The court noted that the state’s interest is in
“communicating to parents and prospective parents that their long-term
148 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003).
149 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
150 Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006).
151 Id. at 1002 (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting in part Lewis v. Harris,
875 A.2d 259, 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parillo, J., concurring)).
152 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
153 Id. at 461.
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committed relationships are uniquely important as a public concern.”154
Morrison v. Sadler likewise highlighted this benefit of marriage: “opposite-
sex marriage is recognized and supported by law in large part to encourage
‘responsible procreation’ by opposite-sex couples, who are the only ones
who can, in fact, procreate ‘by accident[.]’” 155  The Morrison court relied in
part on Justice Cordy’s opinion, dissenting in the Goodridge case, which
suggested that marriage “systematically provided for the regulation of heter-
osexual behavior, brought order to the resulting procreation, and ensured a
stable family structure in which children will be reared, educated and social-
ized,” and that marriage is necessary to “formally bind the husband-father to
his wife and child, and impose on him the responsibilities of fatherhood.”156
Plaintiffs in the marriage cases discussed throughout this Article gener-
ally challenge the responsible procreation argument on the grounds that it is
both under- and over-inclusive, in that different-sex couples may marry
without regard to whether they can or plan to have children and that many
same-sex couples are in fact raising children and would benefit from the
formality of relationships and obligations provided by marriage.  Courts typ-
ically reject these claims on the grounds that, under rational basis review,
statutes may be over- or under-inclusive.157
The “responsible procreation” rationale may also be challenged based
on the sex stereotypes it promotes.  That is, although it may be permissible
and appropriate for a state to seek to promote relationships, at least prior to a
lawful termination of parental rights, between children, born of either mari-
tal or extra-marital sexual relationships,158 and their biological parents, the
“responsible procreation” rationale (and its concern with the possible cost
that children born out of wedlock can place on the public) reflects a deep-
seated assumption that women are likely to be dependent upon men for fi-
nancial security and that men, simply by virtue of their gender, will not be
connected to their children emotionally or financially without being bound
to them by marriage.  Thus, it relies quite explicitly on gendered distinctions
about mothers and fathers.  For example, amicus United Families Interna-
tional and Family Leader Foundation argued in the California marriage liti-
gation that marriage protects “the child and the often vulnerable mother”
154 Id.; see also Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1006 (Alexander, C.J., concurring) (describing
“the optimum mother/father setting for stable family life” and referring to “opposite-sex
homes . . . as [ ] better environment[s] for children”).
155 Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
156 Id. at 25 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995 (Mass.
2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting)).
157 See, e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 980.
158 Different considerations might come into play when regarding the state’s role in
promoting or enforcing the involvement of individuals who donate sperm, eggs, or play a
role in the gestation of children born via assisted reproductive technology.  Additionally,
the state’s interest in furthering the connection of biological parents to their children may
be more effectively achieved by encouraging ongoing relationships between non-custo-
dial parents (who have either never been married to the custodial parent or whose mar-
riage has ended) and their children than by only, or primarily, promoting marriage.
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from lacking adequate support.159  Likewise, a brief filed by several con-
servative religious organizations suggested that marriage is necessary to pro-
tect “children and vulnerable women.”160  Relatedly, many of the briefs
celebrate continuation of the paternal line as one of the primary benefits of
marriage, relying on cases from almost one hundred years ago when so-
called “bastard” children were ostracized as social miscasts.  As a brief sub-
mitted by several conservative legal and family scholars put it, citing a deci-
sion from 1919, “[t]he great end of matrimony is . . . the procreation of a
progeny having legal title to maintenance by the father.”161  Common to all
these briefs is a concern that absent marriage, fathers (again simply by virtue
of their gender) will not play a role in raising their children.162
159 Brief of Amici Curiae United Families International and Family Leader Founda-
tion, supra note 143, at 15. R
160 Brief of Amici Curiae The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints et al.,
supra note 131, at 3. R
161 Brief of Amici Curiae James Q. Wilson et al., Legal and Family Scholars in Sup-
port of Applicants at 12, In re Marriage Cases, 143 Cal. App. 4th 873 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (No. A110449) (quoting Laudo v. Laudo, 197 N.Y.S. 396, 397 (N.Y. App. Div.
1919) (internal citations omitted)); see also, e.g., id. at 15 (arguing the relationship be-
tween “marriage and procreation” is “about two related things: procreation and pater-
nity” and an underlying “concern with illegitimacy”) (quoting Laurence Drew Borten,
Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1114–15
(2002) (internal quotations omitted); Brief of Amici Curiae Clergy of New Jersey at 30,
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. 58,398) (legal requirements that sex
occur only within the context of marriage and allowing marriages to be dissolved if either
party fails to consummate the marriage are essential to save us from becoming a “race of
bastards”) (quoting with approval statements from Raymond v. Raymond, 79 A. 430, 431
(N.J. Ch. 1909)); cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Families Northwest at 15, Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1) (identifying a primary benefit of mar-
riage as ensuring that “socially-valued” children have both a mother and a father).
162 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Center for Law and Justice Northeast,
Inc., supra note 131, at 3 (“The default position . . . is too many children born without R
fathers, too many men abandoning the mothers of their children, and too many women
left alone to care for their offspring”) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A
RESTATEMENT 162 (2001)); Brief of Amici Curiae The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints et al., supra note 131, at 6 (“[C]hildren born to [married parents] will have R
legally enforceable ties to their biological parents and . . . mothers will have legally
enforceable obligations from fathers.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Concerned Women of
America at 7–8, Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-
1) (“[A]side from an act of heterosexual intercourse nine months prior to childbirth,
there is no process for creating a relationship between a man and a woman as parents of a
particular child. The institution of marriage fills this void by formally binding the hus-
band-father to his wife and children, and imposing on him the responsibilities of father-
hood”) (quoting Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995–96 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting))).  The traditional gender-based presumption that the “husband-father” bears
responsibility for providing for his family is intertwined with the tradition that all chil-
dren of a marriage and the wife bear the husband’s last name.  Although modern law has
increased flexibility on this point, a sex-stereotyped preference that a married couple
bears a husband’s last name remains embedded in many state codes.  In most states, men
who choose to take their wives’ last name must file a legal petition, publish notices, and
incur other costs, while women may take their husbands’ names very simply upon mar-
rying. See Greg Risling, Man Files Lawsuit to Take Wife’s Name, Associated Press, Jan.
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Current amici in the marriage debates are not alone in embracing ste-
reotypes about vulnerable women and the necessity for marriage.  In Califor-
nia, at least, such logic was actually among the explicit rationales for
limiting marriage to different-sex couples.  As the legislative history of that
state’s different-sex requirement (which was passed in 1977 after the first
court cases challenging the limitation of marriage to different-sex couples)
explains, marriage’s “special benefits were designed to meet situations
where one spouse, typically the female, could not adequately provide for
herself because she was engaged in raising children.  In other words, the
legal benefits granted married couples were actually designed to accommo-
date motherhood.”163  Again, however, modern sex discrimination jurispru-
dence makes clear that laws or policies premised on the gender-stereotyped
assumption that women are responsible for domestic care and that men are
not, or that men will, by nature of their gender, be irresponsible parents
unless bound by marriage, violate equal protection norms.164
D. Gender Roles in Other Government Programs Encouraging or
Protecting “Traditional” Marriage
Considering the debates over marriage for same-sex couples in the con-
text of other government programs that promote traditional heterosexual
marriage helps expose the underlying sex stereotypes at issue and the harms
they cause to women and men.  The belief that marriage can and should play
a central role in addressing poverty—and concomitant stereotypes about
gender roles within marriage—has had a prominent place in recent welfare
law developments, including “marriage promotion” programs and “respon-
sible fatherhood” initiatives, as well as abstinence-only education.  It is be-
yond the scope of this Article to comprehensively review these rapidly
growing programs.165  Many, however, are supported by the same conserva-
12, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/01/12/man_files
_lawsuit_to_take_wifes_name.
163 Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, Digest of Assemb. Bill 607 (1977-78 Reg.
Sess.) Apr. 14, 1977, at 1–2.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 101–113. R
165 Other commentators have discussed the sex stereotypes perpetuated by the gov-
ernment’s promotion of “traditional” gender roles in these programs and, in some cases,
drawn connections to the same-sex marriage debates. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, Con-
testing Conservativisms, Family Feuds, and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 429–30, 445–46 (2005) (discussing how social conserva-
tives seek to promote the traditional family with its “highly gendered roles” in marriage
promotion and responsible fatherhood programs that “will allow fathers to assume their
‘proper’ position as breadwinner for the family”); Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, Mar-
riage, and Morality: The Pro-Marriage Discourse of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing conservative conceptions of mothers’ roles in marriage
promotion and responsible fatherhood initiatives); Nancy Leong, Examining the Con-
servative Family Planning Agenda, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 81, 101–12 (2006) (discussing
gender-based stereotypes promoted by conservative family planning policies, including
abstinence-only education); JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS (2002) (discussing gen-
der-based stereotypes promoted by abstinence-only education).
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tive organizations that oppose permitting same-sex couples to marry.166
And, as the brief discussion below makes clear, the conservative conception
of “marriage” put forward in many of these programs relies upon and per-
petuates the same sex-based stereotypes that underlie the rationales offered
to justify limiting marriage to different-sex couples.
Indeed, as noted above in the discussion of the opposition to the federal
ERA,167 conservative advocates often make explicit connections between op-
position to marriage by individuals of the same sex and preservation of
“traditional” gender-differentiated family roles.  For example, as Reva
Siegel has observed, many leading social conservatives, including the late
Jerry Falwell (former leader of the Moral Majority), Paul Weyrich (founder
of the Heritage Foundation), Phyllis Schlafly (founder of the Eagle Forum
and a leader of opposition to the ERA), Gary Bauer (former leader of the
Family Research Council), as well as other senior representatives of Con-
cerned Women for America, the Heritage Foundation, Priests for Life, and
Alliance for the Family, have endorsed The Natural Family: A Manifesto,
authored by Allan C. Carlson and Paul T. Mero.168  The Manifesto “af-
firm[s] the natural family to be the union of a man and a woman through
marriage” and characterizes such union as the “ideal, optimal, true family
system,” dismissing “all other ‘family forms’ [as] incomplete or . . .
fabrications of the state.”169
166 Many of the groups that submitted amicus briefs opposing permission of same-sex
marriage or that otherwise sought to limit marriage to different-sex couples also explicitly
support marriage promotion, responsible fatherhood initiatives, and abstinence-only edu-
cation.  For example, the Family Research Council, which filed a brief in the Washington
case, has several position papers in favor of abstinence education. See Family Research
Counsel, Policy Areas: Abstinence Education, http://www.frc.org/file.cfm?f=KEY
WORD&key=ABSTED&tg=FF (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).  The Alliance for Mar-
riage, which filed a brief in the New Jersey case, lists welfare reform as one of its primary
focuses and “calls on Congress . . . to embrace marriage-friendly welfare reforms” be-
cause “[m]arriage is what makes fatherhood more than a biological event.”  Alliance for
Marriage, Multicultural Alliance Calls on Congress to Embrace Marriage-Friendly Wel-
fare Reforms that will Benefit Low-Income Families,  http://www.allianceformarriage.
org (follow “Information Center” hyperlink; then follow “Welfare Reform” hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007).  Even in the absence of such direct connections, understand-
ing the stereotyped views of women and men’s roles that are used to justify marriage
promotion, responsible fatherhood initiatives, and abstinence-only education helps make
clear the extent to which such stereotypes animate government funding in this area.  This
is not to say, of course, that sex stereotypes are the only justifications for such programs.
Indeed, there are other policy justifications, some more legitimate, offered for these
programs.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 23–29. R
168 Allan C. Carlson & Paul T. Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto, in THE FAM-
ILY IN AMERICA (2005), available for download at http://www.familymanifesto.net/fm/
obtain.asp.  For discussion of endorsers of the Manifesto and their affiliations, see Siegel,
The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 34, at 1005–06 & nn.59–67 (citing The Natural R
Family: A Manifesto, Featured Endorsements, http://familymanifesto.net/fm/endorse-
ments.asp). Our thanks to Reva Siegel for bringing the Manifesto to our attention.
169 Carlson & Mero, supra note 168, at 4. R
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While proclaiming a “whole-hearted” belief in women’s rights,170 the
Manifesto rejects modern sex discrimination law’s requirement that men and
women receive equal pay for equal work in favor of a “‘family wage’ ideal
of ‘equal pay for equal family responsibility’” (that is, that “heads” of
households, typically men, may be paid a premium)171 and defines women’s
rights as protecting rights that “recognize women’s unique gifts of preg-
nancy, birthing, and breastfeeding.”172  The Manifesto asserts that “women
and men are equal in dignity and innate human rights, but different in func-
tion” and advocates a “true home economy” that, through ending the “ag-
gressive state promotion of androgyny,” permits “men and women to live in
harmony with their true natures.”173  It is clear that those “true natures” are
framed as dependent on gender-differentiation: women are expected to be
“homemakers” and men are expected to be “homebuilders.” 174  Further-
more, the Manifesto embraces several related policy objectives as stepping
stones to a redefinition of the modern family:
It is not enough to stop public recognition of “gay marriage,” nor
to oppose “safe sex education” in the public schools, nor to ban
partial birth abortion, nor to create optional “covenant” marriages
. . . unless the natural family is freed from the oppression of post-
family ideologues, unless we build a broad culture of marriage and
life.175
In other words, social conservative advocates explicitly frame their opposi-
tion to permitting same-sex couples to marry as part of a larger agenda to
roll back modern sex discrimination law and encourage government promo-
tion of sex-stereotyped gender roles.
The influence of the “traditional” family movement, represented by the
Manifesto, has increased dramatically in recent decades, and the result has
been a significant growth in government policies regarding marriage that
adopt sex-stereotyped roles.  For example, the 1996 federal welfare reform
legislation, creating the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”)
program, strongly encourages marriage as a poverty reform measure for poor
women, with three of the four purposes stated for the new program focusing
on marriage.176  Echoing the “vulnerable” women rationales used in the de-
170 Id. at 7.
171 Id. at 5; see also id. at 3 (characterizing “family wage” as a historical system in
which “the industrial sector could claim only one adult per family, the father, who in turn
had the natural right to a living wage that would also sustain a mother and children at
home in decency”).
172 Id. at 7.
173 Id. at 6.
174 Id. at 4 (“We envision young women growing into wives, homemakers, and
mothers; and we see young men growing into husbands, homebuilders, and fathers.”)
(emphasis added).
175 Id. at 9.
176 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Wel-
fare Reform Act), 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000).  The purposes of TANF are to:
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bates over marriage for same-sex couples, marriage promotion programs im-
plicitly—and sometimes explicitly—promote the idea that women must
depend on a male breadwinner for their economic security rather than their
own wage earning capacity.  In some cases, the sex discrimination is readily
apparent.  For example, a marriage promotion program in Allentown, Penn-
sylvania was challenged as sex discriminatory because it provided funds for
job training and placement for fathers, but not mothers, participating in the
program.177
TANF reauthorization in 2005 committed $150 million per year for
marriage promotion activities and for “responsible fatherhood” programs.178
The authorized activities for the “responsible fatherhood” programs are ex-
plicitly discriminatory in that they permit funds to be awarded to programs
to “foster economic stability by helping fathers improve their economic sta-
tus” by providing activities such as job search assistance, job training, subsi-
dized employment, education, and referrals.179  Thus, rather than providing
assistance to non-custodial parents (or to all parents), whatever their gender,
the program specifically limits job training activities to fathers.180
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents
on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3)
prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish an-
nual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these
pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families.
Id.  TANF explicitly ended the entitlement nature of previous welfare programs. 42
U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000).
177 Class Complaint of Sex Discrimination in Violation of Title IX, NOW Legal De-
fense Fund, No. 04-19110 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Feb. 4, 2004) (on file with
author).  Shortly after receiving the complaint, the Office of Civil Rights informed Legal
Momentum that the program in question would provide job training to both mothers and
fathers. See Community Services for Children Complaint, Legal Momentum Individual
Case Description, http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/inthecourts/2006/03/com-
munity_services_for_childre.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
178 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7103(a), 120 Stat. 138
(2005).
179 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 603(a)(2)(C)(ii)(III) (2007)) (emphasis added).
180 On March 28, 2007, the National Organization for Women (“NOW”) and Legal
Momentum filed civil rights complaints challenging 34 of the 100 first “Responsible
Fatherhood” programs funded under the initiative as sex discriminatory because they,
according to their project summaries, provided job training services to men but not to
women.  Complaints available at http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/programs/
sexualityandfamilyrights/2007/03/legal_momentum_and_now_file_co.php.  Although at
the time of press the complaints were not yet resolved, one program at least immediately
responded to the complaint by changing its policy to provide job-training services to
women as well. See Christopher Lee, NOW Demands Access to Program Geared to
Fathers, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/28/AR2007032802065.html (quoting representative of D.C.
Department of Human Services as saying women were not eligible to participate in the
D.C. Fatherhood Initiative program); Christopher Lee, Mothers Are Eligible, Too, Official
Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2007, at BO3 (quoting director of program indicating that the
fatherhood programs would serve mothers as well).
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The 1996 welfare reform law, which included the stated goal of reduc-
ing the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies,181 also included a signifi-
cant increase in federally-funded abstinence-only education programs.
These programs teach that sexual relationships should only occur within the
context of heterosexual marriage.  Although federal funding for abstinence-
only programs began in the early 1980s,182 the 1996 welfare reform legisla-
tion created a large new funding stream,183 and funding for abstinence-only
programs has risen even more rapidly during George W. Bush’s administra-
tions.184  In fiscal year 2006, $215 million dollars went to these programs, an
increase of 15% from the previous year and more than twice as much as was
appropriated in fiscal year 2001.185
The federal guidelines for these programs require that they teach absti-
nence from sexual activity as “the only certain way to avoid out-of-wedlock
pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and other associated health
problems.”186  The primary federal funding source also explicitly prohibits
discussion of abortion or contraception methods other than to emphasize
their failure rates.187  The scientific inaccuracies and distortions of such pro-
grams have been widely documented.188
What is most relevant in this context, however, is that the programs
both condemn homosexuality and promote sex stereotypes.  The federal
guidelines require that programs teach that a “mutually faithful monoga-
181 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3) (2000).
182 Adolescent Family Life Act, in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 42
U.S.C. § 300z (2000).
183 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 710 (2000) (often referred to as Section 510 of Title V of the Social Security
Act).
184 LEGAL MOMENTUM, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ABSTINENCE ONLY FUNDING 3 (2007),
available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/publications/Overviewof
Abs.pdf.  The Bush administration has authorized large grants under the Special Projects
of Regional and National Significance—Community Based Abstinence Education
(“CBAE”). Id. at 8–9.
185 Legal Momentum, Sex, Lies & Stereotypes, Federal Funding for Abstinence-Only
Programs, available at http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/files/federalfunding
cpcwebpage.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
186 42 U.S.C.A. § 710(b)(2)(C) (2007) (emphasis added).  This definition covers both
programs funded directly under TANF and those funded under CBAE grants.
187 See, e.g., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Administration for Children and Fami-
lies, Funding Opportunity Description, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/
HHS-2006-ACF-ACYF-AE-0099.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) [hereinafter CBAE
Funding Guidelines].
188 See, e.g., U.S. H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTI-
GATIONS DIV., THE CONTENT OF FEDERALLY FUNDED ABSTINENCE-ONLY EDUCATION PRO-
GRAMS (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman) (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter Waxman Report],
available at http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20041201102153-50247.pdf  (docu-
menting false information about the effectiveness of contraceptives and the risks of abor-
tion, as well as other inaccuracies, in abstinence-only education materials); Hazel Glenn
Beh & Milton Diamond, The Failure of Abstinence-Only Education: Minors Have a
Right to Honest Talk about Sex, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 12 (2006) (charging that
abstinence-only education fails to properly protect minors’ health and ignores the needs
of sexual minority youth).
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mous relationship in the context of marriage is the expected standard of sex-
ual activity” and that “sexual activity outside . . . of marriage is likely to
have harmful psychological and physical effects.”189  The primary federal
funding source also requires that curricula specifically define marriage as
only between a man and a woman.190  Thus, the programs explicitly con-
demn any sexual activity by lesbian and gay youth or adults who, of course,
cannot enjoy such activity within the context of marriage anywhere in the
United States but Massachusetts.  Indeed, several of the curricula used in the
programs explicitly stigmatize homosexuality.  For example, one popular
curriculum teaches that “[r]esearch shows the homosexual lifestyle is not a
healthy alternative for males or females. . . .  [t]his lifestyle should not be
encouraged as healthy or as an equal alternative to marriage.”191
Additionally, abstinence-only education is often grounded in essential-
ized differences between girls and boys, and by implication, women and
men: girls and women want emotional companionship and boys and men
want sex.  As Judith Levine aptly demonstrates in documenting the rise of
abstinence-only sex education in the United States, abstinence-only curricula
often position “the peer doing the pressuring [as] male [and] the refuser-
delayer [as] female.”192  Levine further explains, “girls are not supposed to
feel desire and are charged with guarding the sexual gates.”193  In effect,
abstinence-only education locates girls as objects of desire and boys as sex-
ual subjects.194
189 42 U.S.C.A. § 710(b)(D)–(E) (2007).
190 See CBAE Funding Guidelines, supra note 187 (specifying that “[t]hroughout the R
entire curriculum, the term ‘marriage’ must be defined as only a legal union between one
man and one woman as a husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife”).
191 Letter from Rep. Henry Waxman, H.R. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, to David M.
Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Oct. 6, 2005) (quoting
NAT’L ABSTINENCE CLEARINGHOUSE, ABSTINENCE 101 88–90 (2005)), available at http://
reform.democrats.house.gov/Documents/20051006114033-87692.pdf.  For an important
critique of the “homosexual lifestyle” trope, see David B. Cruz, The New “Marital Prop-
erty”: Civil Marriage and the Right to Exclude?, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 279, 297–301
(2001).
192 LEVINE, supra note 165, at 129. R
193 Id. at 136.
194 Interestingly, abstinence-only education may result in more unplanned
pregnancies due to the fact that young people are not getting information on contracep-
tives. See id. at 112 (“[B]ecause many abstinence programs teach kids that refraining
from intercourse is the only surefire way to prevent pregnancy and vastly exaggerate the
failures of contraception and condoms, students get the impression that birth control and
STD prevention methods don’t work.  So they shrug off using them or don’t know how to
use them.  Contraception education, on the other hand, works: teens who learn about birth
control and condoms are 70 to 80 percent more likely to protect themselves if they have
intercourse than kids who are not given such lessons.”).  It is ironic indeed that these
types of unplanned pregnancies become the justification for the “responsible procrea-
tion” rationale for why heterosexual marriage benefits are essential to bind the otherwise
unwed mother to the potentially absent father. See supra text accompanying notes
149–156. R
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To bolster the claim that girls and boys are essentially and necessarily
“different” and that they play different roles within relationships, the pro-
grams consciously perpetuate outdated (and in other contexts acknowledged
as discriminatory) stereotypes in support of the notion that marriage to a
man is necessary to provide support and protection for otherwise vulnerable
women.  For example, one popular curriculum lists “Financial Support” as
one of the “5 Major Needs of Women” and “Domestic Support” as one of
the “5 Major Needs of Men.”195  Another teaches, “The father gives the
bride to the groom because he is the one man who has had the responsibility
of protecting her throughout her life.  He is now giving his daughter to the
only other man who will take over this protective role.”196  In fact, propo-
nents of abstinence-only curricula often shamelessly (indeed, proudly) pro-
mote a family structure in which the father plays an unquestioned role as
“head” of the family.197  Thus, even as the law has formally rejected as-
sumptions that men are in charge of the family, that women need to be pro-
tected, or that a daughter upon marriage passes from control of one man, her
father, to another, her husband, government-funded abstinence-only curric-
ula consciously perpetuate such rigid gender norms.
Indeed, the array of current governmental efforts discussed above—
including restricting marriage to different-sex couples, teaching children that
sex must be exclusive to marriage, and promoting marriage to low-income
women—relies on larger ideas about what it means to be an adult of one’s
gender.  Children and adults alike are being taught that marrying a woman is
an essential, natural part of being an adult man, and marrying a man is an
essential, natural part of being an adult woman.  This is a sex-stereotypical
expectation in its most basic, essentialized form.
195 Waxman Report, supra note 188, at 17 (quoting JONEEN KRAUTH, WAIT TRAINING: R
LEARN HOW TO HAVE THE BEST SEX . . . BY WAITING TILL MARRIAGE! 199).  Another,
seeking to demonstrate to students that boys and girls are “different,” suggests that the
teacher ask students to “give examples of responsibilities a mother and father may have
in order to help a family run smoothly” and then ask students to identify “which parent is
more likely to cut grass, wash clothes, decorate the home, etc.” KRIS FRAINIE, WHY
KNOW ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS: TEACHER’S MANUAL 4 (Marcia Swearington &
Pam Sulser eds., AAA Women’s Services 2002).  Indeed, these are the exact types of
overbroad generalizations that sex-based equal protection law condemns. See, e.g.,
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (explaining that a sex-based classifi-
cation “must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities,
or preferences of males and females”).
196 FRAINIE, supra note 195, at 60. R
197 In one of the clearest examples, the movement celebrates the growing popularity
of “purity balls,” in which girls solemnize their commitment to abstinence by accepting a
virginity ring from their fathers, which they are to wear until they are married.  Jennifer
Baumgardner, Would You Pledge Your Virginity to Your Father?, GLAMOUR, Feb. 2007,
available at http://www.glamour.com/news/articles/2007/01/purityballs07feb.  Fathers, in
turn, take a pledge that “as the high priest in [their] home[s]” they will “cover [their]
daughter[s] as [their] authority and protection in the area of purity.”  Lynn Harris,
Daddy’s Little Virgin, SALON.COM, May 3, 2006, http://www.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/
2006/05/03/purity_balls/index.html.
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CONCLUSION
Same-sex couples seeking the right to marry have long contended that
specifying that marriage must be between a man and a woman is a form of
sex discrimination.  Although the facial discrimination implicit in the sex-
based classifications in state marriage laws is clear, courts have rejected sex
discrimination claims on the grounds that restrictive marriage statutes apply
“equally” to men and to women.  This Article has highlighted ways in
which litigants may advance a strengthened sex discrimination argument by
articulating the explicit connection between restrictive marriage statutes’ fa-
cial discrimination and the sex stereotyping that underlies the rationales of-
fered to justify those sex classifications.  Naturally, only time and litigation
will tell whether courts are more likely to embrace an argument based on an
integrated theory of facial and sex stereotype discrimination than they were
to accept the decoupled arguments.  The clear sex stereotypes at play in the
recent decisions, however, demonstrate the integrated argument’s saliency
and significance.  Sanctioning sex-based classifications on the grounds that
men and women, simply by virtue of their gender, necessarily play different
roles in the lives of their children and in their relationships with each other
causes concrete harm to women and to men throughout our society.  It
should properly be rejected as sex discrimination.
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